Another FBAR Plea And Notice of Government Change of Position on Applicable Guidelines (10/27/17)

DOJ Tax announced here another FBAR plea.  The defendant is Hyung Kwon Kim, identified as a "Greenwich, Connecticut man" (which I presume means a Greenwich Connecticut resident), and the plea was entered in the ED VA.  I link also the following:

• The criminal information, here, to which the plea was entered
• The Plea Agreement, here.
• The Statement of Facts, here.
• The Docket Entries as of about 1:30 pm 10/27/17, here.

The key excerpts from the press release are:

According to court documents and information provided in court, Hyung Kwon Kim, a citizen of South Korea and, since 1998, a legal permanent resident of the United States, resided in Massachusetts and later in Connecticut.  Around 1998, Kim traveled to Switzerland to identify financial institutions at which to open accounts for the purpose of receiving transfers of funds from another individual in Hong Kong.  Over the next few years, Kim opened accounts at several banks, including Credit Suisse, UBS, Bank Leu, Clariden Leu, and Bank Hofmann.  In 2004, the value of the funds in Kim’s accounts exceeded $28 million. 

* * * * 

Kim conspired with several bankers, including Dr. Edgar H. Paltzer, to conceal the funds from U.S. authorities.  Paltzer, who was convicted in 2013 in the Southern District of New York for conspiring to defraud the United States, and the other bankers assisted Kim in opening accounts in the names of sham entities organized in Lichtenstein, Panama and the British Virgin Islands.  Paltzer and the other bankers facilitated financial transactions for Kim, so that Kim could use the funds in the United States.  For example, between 2003 and 2004, Kim directed Paltzer and another banker to issue nearly $3 million in checks payable to third parties in the United States for the purchase of a residence in Greenwich, Connecticut.  In 2005, Kim created a nominee entity to hold title for the purchase of another home on Stage Harbor in Chatham, Massachusetts, for nearly $5 million.  Kim and Paltzer communicated about the purchase in a manner that created the appearance that Kim was renting the property from a fictitious owner. 

Between 2000 and 2008, Kim took multiple trips to Zurich, Switzerland and withdrew more than $600,000 in cash during these visits.  He also brought his offshore assets back to the United States by purchasing millions of dollars’ worth of jewelry and loose gems.  For example, in 2008, Kim purchased an 8.6 carat ruby ring from a jeweler in Greenwich, Connecticut, which he financed by causing Bank Leu to issue three checks totaling $2.2 million to the jeweler. 

In 2008, during a trip to Zurich, Kim’s banker at Clariden Leu informed Kim that due to ongoing investigations in the United States, Kim could either disclose the accounts to the U.S. government, spend the funds, or move the funds to another institution.  Kim moved the funds into nominee accounts at another bank. In 2011, Kim liquidated the accounts by, among other things, withdrawing tens of thousands of dollars in cash and purchasing three loose diamonds for about $1.7 million from the Greenwich jeweler. 

Kim also admitted that from 2000 through 2011, he filed false income tax returns for 1999 through 2010, on which he failed to report income from the assets held in the foreign financial accounts that he owned and controlled in Switzerland.
As part of his plea agreement, Kim will pay a civil penalty of over $14 million dollars to the United States Treasury for failing to file, and filing false, FBARs, which is separate from any restitution the Court may order.

Now, just a few comments on the documents linked above.

Court Sustains $10,000 Per Year § 6038(b) Penalty for Form 5471 Noncompliance for Taxpayer Who Withdrew from 2009 OVDP (8/9/17)

In Dewees v. United States, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124989 (D.C. D.C. 2017), here, Dewees, a U.S. citizen residing in Canada, was fined $120,000 -- $10,000 per years for From 5471 noncompliance.  After assessment of that penalty, Dewees declined to pay.  He lived in Canada and apparently felt he was outside the IRS's ability to compel  payment.  Pursuant to the U.S. Canada tax treaty, however, the U.S. enlisted the Canadian tax authority to withhold a Canadian tax refund due Dewees.  At that point, Dewees paid the penalty and brought this suit to have his payments refunded on various constitutional grounds -- Eighth Amendment, Due Process and Equal Protection.  On motion of the U.S., the court dismissed the complaint.

I link the following documents:

• Complaint, here.
• U.S. Motion, here.
• Dewees' Opposition, here.
• U.S. reply, here.
• Docket Entries as of 8/9/17, here.

The key timeline that I derive from the opinion and the foregoing documents are:

1. Dewees successfully joined OVDP in 2009.  The 2009 iteration of OVDP had the following requirements:  (i) filing income tax returns for 6 years; (ii) paying income tax, 20% accuracy related penalty, and interest on both; (iii) filing FBARs for 6 years; (iii) paying an IRS penalty now called a miscellaneous offshore penalty in lieu of all other penalties, including the FBAR penalty and Form 5471 penalties.

2. It is not clear from what I saw (I did not study the documents carefully for nuance) whether Dewees completed the package including the Forms 1040 or 1040X, the 5471s, and the FBARs.  It appears that there was some commotion between the IRS and Dewees as to whether he had submitted all information.

3.  On May 26, 2010, the IRS notified Dewees that he would be "terminated from the OVDP for failure to furnish the requested 1040s and FBAR forms (for the years 2003-2008).

4.  "In June 2010, the filings requested in the correspondence dated May 19, 2010 were resent."

5.  On October 28, 2010, a $252,480 penalty assessment was made against Dewees.  Dewees alleges that the penalty assessment was "relating to FBAR non-compliance."  The Government states that it was assessed "under the terms of the OVDP."  If the Government's statement is correct, the penalty assessment was the MOP assessment in lieu of all penalties other than the income tax penalty; in Dewees case, the MOP penalty would have been in lieu of the FBAR penalty and the Form 5471 penalty.  [JAT comment:  a question I have is how the MOP could have moved to assessment without the taxpayer having signed a closing agreement inside the OVDP penalty structure, but I could not find the answer to that question.]

6.  "On November 19, 2010 the penalty assessed is reduced to $185,862, as some accounts had been double counted by the IRS."

7.  "On January 13, 2011 Mr. Dewees receives notification that he is at risk of being terminated from the OVDP program because of his failure to pay the assessed penalty."

8.  "On June 9, 2011, Mr. Dewees received a letter from Mr. Harrington [IRS Agent] requesting confirmation of his intent to no longer participate in the OVDP."

9.  "On June 16, 2011 Mr. Dewees confirms his withdrawal from the OVDP based on the excessive amount of penalties owing. The penalties were removed from his account."  [JAT comment:  this would be consistent with the penalties being MOP rather than FBAR because the MOP could not be assessed unless he completed OVDP without opting out or being removed.]

10.  "On September 20, 2011 Mr. Dewees receives a letter from Mr. Harrington dated September 9, 2011, imposing a new $120,000 of penalties for the late filing of Form 5471. The letter indicates that reasonable cause for failure to file will be considered."  [JAT Comment:  This is consistent with Dewees being removed from OVDP because he would have lost his Form 5471 penalty protection.]

11.  Now, if the taxpayer truly were removed from OVDP, he should have been subject to risk of assessment of FBAR penalties.  From what I have seen, it is not clear that FBAR penalties were imposed.  I infer from the IRS's imposition of maximum Form 5471 penalties that the IRS did not think he was a nonwillful actor, but still there is no indication what, if anything, happened on the FBAR penalties.

Simon Redux - Ineffective Assistance of Counsel After All Else Fails (7/11/16)

A frequent venue for Monday morning quarterbacking in a criminal setting is the proceeding under 28 USC § 2255, here, which is a modern descendant of the common law writ of habeas corpus.  Setting aside procedural requirements, the § 2255 remedy is available

(a) A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.

A common claim in a § 2255 proceeding is that the prisoner's attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel at the criminal trial leading to incarceration.

James A. Simon, a person about whom I have devoted several blog entries during his trial and appeal, used § 2255 for such Monday morning quarterbacking on the basis of claimed ineffective assistance of counsel.  Although mentioned in a number of blogs, prior to this blog, the last significant entry was Simon's Last Hurrah / Fizzle? (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 8/16/13), here.  This blog discusses his most recent case, a § 2255 proceeding.  United States v. Simon, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86584 (ND IN 2016), here.

Prefatory to getting into the decision, I just state at the out set that I think it is a well-written and reasoned decision.  The author is Robert L. Miller (Wikipedia entry here), who handled the trial and thus was uniquely situated to observe the effectiveness of defense counsel and the effect of any counsel errors on the outcome of the case.  Plus, from my reading of the decisions he has written, particularly in the Simon trajectory through the end of the criminal trial, he seems to be a smart and good judge.

Now to dig into the details.  The opinion is long, 51 pages.  I cover only the highlights related to tax and FBAR in this blog entry.  He was also convicted of mail fraud charges and made § 2255 claims for those convictions, but I do not address them here.  He also made the claim about that the trial attorney erred in not having Simon testify at trial, a quintessential type of judgment call.  I do not address that claim here.  

I start out first with an excerpt where Judge Miller summarizes background:

Mr. Simon was a certified accountant, professor of accounting, and entrepreneur with interests in several businesses and entities. One of those ventures was JAS Partners, a domestic limited partnership in which Mr. Simon and his wife each had a one percent partnership stake and the Cook Islands-based Simon Family Trust owned the other 98 percent. Another of Mr. Simon's ventures was Elekta Ltd., a corporation chiefly owned by Mr. Simon's retired sisters but entrusted wholly to Mr. Simon's management. Elekta owned nineteen percent of a third venture that Mr. Simon managed, JS Elekta. JS Elekta in turn owned 75 percent of a fourth business, Ichua Company, also managed by Mr. Simon. Of those four businesses over which Mr. Simon had signature authority, three — Elekta, JS Elekta, and Ichua — were foreign entities possessing foreign bank accounts. 

This case is about money that Mr. Simon paid to himself from those four entities and from another domestic venture, William R. Simon Farms. Between 2003 and 2006, Mr. Simon (or his immediate family members) received about $1.8 million combined from the businesses, which Mr. Simon spent on personal and family expenses and recorded as loans in his personal financial records. No promissory notes existed for these purported loans, and Mr. Simon paid no interest to the companies that made them. He repaid a small portion of the principal to JAS Partners after becoming aware of the government's investigation into his finances. He reported none of this money as income on his tax returns. In 2005 Mr. Simon paid less than $400 in taxes, and in each of the other three years between 2003 and 2006 he paid no taxes at all and claimed a refund. None of the tax returns disclosed that Mr. Simon had interests in or control over foreign bank accounts. Mr. Simon prepared and filed these tax returns himself. 

During these years, Mr. Simon filled out need-based financial aid applications for the private schools his children attended. On these applications, he reported that he had no or very little income, suffered large debts or losses, spent no money on clubs or vacations, had only a few thousand dollars of assets, was in a precarious financial situation due to business failures and litigation, and had enough money to keep him "afloat but barely." These representations were all false: Mr. Simon had the payments from his businesses, spent lavishly on several expensive club memberships, and could afford vacations to Europe and Disney World in addition to a comfortable lifestyle for himself and his family. Based solely on these applications and the tax forms Mr. Simon submitted, the schools gave the Simon family a total of $120,000 in need-based financial aid. Mr. Simon also filled out federal "FAFSA" financial aid applications for one of his daughters to attend college. As he did on his private financial aid applications, Mr. Simon reported minimal gross income and assets on the FAFSA application.
In November 2007, IRS agents searched Mr. Simon's house pursuant to a warrant. Mr. Simon hired attorneys soon after that and began preparing a defense to possible charges. His attorneys hired a team of investigators and conducted their own investigation into Mr. Simon's finances, including interviewing the people already interviewed by government agents. Mr. Simon's defense team also met with prosecutors to discuss the probable charges, to guide their planning of colorable defenses. 

In April 2010, Mr. Simon was charged in a 23-count indictment. Counts 1-4 alleged that Mr. Simon filed false tax returns for the years 2003-2006. The tax returns were allegedly false in that they underreported income, and in that they didn't check the "yes" box of Line 7a on Schedule B to IRS Form 1040. The question associated with Line 7a asked whether Mr. Simon had any interest in or authority over foreign accounts. Counts 5-8 charged Mr. Simon with failing to file forms called Reports of Foreign Bank and Financial Account, or "FBARs," for the years 2004-2007. FBARs concern foreign financial accounts, and a person is required to file them if he or she has an interest in or signature authority over foreign accounts worth more than $10,000. Counts 9-19 charged Mr. Simon with mail fraud related to the need-based financial aid applications he made to the private schools his children attended. Those counts alleged that Mr. Simon underreported his income on the forms, and that the tax returns he attached were fraudulent for the same reasons as alleged in counts 1-4. Counts 20-23 charged Mr. Simon with federal financial aid fraud based on the FAFSA forms he filled out on his daughter's behalf. The FAFSA application required Mr. Simon to include information from his tax returns; if the tax returns were false (as alleged in counts 1-4), the aid applications were fraudulent as well. 

Articles on ICIJ's Panama Papers and Ramifications (4/25/16)

Introduction:  The following Wikipedia entries may offer updated information from time to time:

• Wikipedia entry on Panama Papers, here.
• Wikipedia list of people named in Panama Papers, here.

In addition, this searchable list from the Sunday Times might be worth consulting from time to time.  Josh Boswell, Tom Wills, Andrew Rininsland, Panama papers: the names: Search our database of 37,000 names linked to Mossack Fonseca companies in the tax haven of Panama (Sunday Times 4/10/16), here.  The linked page offers at the bottom a downloadable zip file with the data, here, which includes a csv file which is apparently 102.54 MB in size (presumably this could be imported into an MS Excel file, although I have not yet done that) and a "README.TXT" file to explain certain matters about the data.  Apparently this file lists the companies and directors, shareholders, and legal agents for the companies.

Panama Papers: Mossack Fonseca raids seize 'large amount of evidence' (ABC News 4/22/16), here.

Panamanian investigators have raided a property used by Mossack Fonseca, the law firm at the centre of a massive leak of offshore financial data, removing bags full of shredded documents as evidence, a local prosecutor said. 

"We have secured a large amount of evidence found in the location," said organised crime investigator Javier Caraballo. 

He said they also found many shredded papers, which they removed as evidence.
In a statement, Mossack Fonseca said it had digitised all its documents and that the shredded papers taken from its premises were bound for recycling. 

The law firm added that as a result of a previous search, prosecutors already had copies of all the documents they removed on Friday (local time).

Charles (Chuck) Rettig, US Launches Criminal Inquiry Into 200 US Citizens Named In The Panama Papers (Forbes 4/23/16), here.

The Panama Papers. A massive law firm data breach of otherwise secretive financial information identifying numerous high-ranking government and public officials around the world was recently disclosed online by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists. (ICIJ). Almost forty years of confidential information from 1977 to December 2015 was somehow obtained by an anonymous source from the internal database of Panama-based law firm Mossack Fonseca & Co. and apparently includes approximately 11.46 million files comprising approximately 2.6 terabytes (the equivalent of approximately 600 DVDs) of otherwise confidential financial data. 

US Launches Criminal Inquiry into Several of the 200 US Citizens Named in the Panama Papers. The ICIJ has now confirmed that it received an email (published by the Guardian) from U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara for the Southern SO +0.00% District of New York indicating that his office had “opened a criminal investigation regarding matters to which the Panama Papers are relevant.” Further, his office would greatly appreciate the opportunity to speak as soon as possible with any ICIJ employee or representative involved in the Panama Papers Project in order to discuss this matter further.” 

* * * * 

Seventh Circuit Holds that Trial Court Did Not Err in Admitting Other Acts Evidence (4/7/150

In United States v. Curtis, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 5176 (7th Cir. 2015), here, the defendant was a lawyer who could not manage his tax debts.  Over the years he was repeatedly delinquent.  The IRS had to spent significant collection resources to try to get him to pay and then stay current.  Finally, after cycling through to the third revenue officer, he was referred for criminal investigation and this prosecution ensued for 3-years of failure to file, § 7203, here.

Prior to trial, the government indicated its intention to offer evidence under Rule 404(b), including evidence of Curtis's history of failing to pay his taxes, his past dealings with the IRS and its efforts to collect back taxes, and his withdrawals of money from his law practice to pay personal expenses. Curtis did not object to any of this evidence, conceding that it was relevant to his intent and knowledge during the charged years. But he did object to the government's proposed evidence that he failed to pay payroll taxes for his law firms's employees for the third and fourth quarters of 2013. The government argued that this evidence was relevant to Curtis's intent and especially relevant to rebut his anticipated defense that he acted in good faith. Curtis objected that any violations of the tax laws subsequent to the charged years did not bear on his state of mind during the time of the charged offenses. Instead, he maintained, the government's use of this evidence demonstrated nothing other than propensity to commit the crime, a forbidden use of such evidence. Curtis also argued that the evidence was not relevant to his intent because payroll taxes are different in kind from income taxes, payroll taxes are often paid by office administrators, and the failure to pay those taxes post-dated the offense conduct by several years. The evidence would also cause undue prejudice, Curtis argued, because it would imply that he was harming his employees as well as the government. In short, he contended that the payroll tax evidence did not meet the standards for admission under Rule 404(b). The district court agreed that the evidence demonstrated propensity, and tentatively granted Curtis's motion to exclude the payroll tax evidence from the trial. 

The court later reversed course and allowed the government to bring in this evidence after Curtis testified during the defense case-in-chief that he was current on his tax obligations for 2010, 2011 and 2012. Curtis declined the court's offer of a limiting instruction on this Rule 404(b) evidence. * * * * The jury convicted on all three counts, and Curtis appeals.

The Seventh Circuit starts by stating the elements of Section 7203, the convicted counts:  "(1) that Curtis was required to pay taxes; (2) that Curtis failed to pay the taxes; and (3) that Curtis acted willfully in failing to pay."  As is often the case, the defense was solely that the Government had not proved willfulness.  Quoting Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991), willfulness "requires the Government to prove that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty."   Curtis' defense,  as I understand it, was that his years of dealing with the IRS's tolerance for his various tax delinquencies lulled him into believing that his tax delinquencies did not violate the  law.

The Government sought to use 404(b) evidence, including principally his repeated delinquencies after the criminal case was brought against him.  Specifically, the Government sought to show that he failed "to pay payroll taxes for his law business in the third and fourth quarters of 2013."  Curtis objected, arguing that what he did after the years for which he was charged was not evidence as to his willfulness or nonwillfulness for the earlier years for which he was charged.  He did not object to proof as to earlier years' delinquencies in payment.  Further, he testified that he had fully paid his 2010, 2011 and 2012 taxes.  Focusing on the subsequent unpaid payroll taxes, Curtis argued that they were remote from the charged offense of failure to file.

The [trial] court ultimately ruled that Curtis opened the door to admission of the evidence by suggesting to the jury that he had paid in full his recent tax obligations. The government then questioned Curtis about his failure to pay the payroll taxes. R. 51, Tr. at 568-72. Specifically, the government questioned Curtis regarding how he spent money that he withdrew from his law firm and how he decided which bills to pay. The focus of the questioning was that Curtis chose repeatedly to pay other obligations instead of paying taxes, including the payroll taxes.\ 

The government made no further mention of Curtis's failure to pay the payroll taxes in two quarters of 2013.

Curtis argued on appeal that the Court should not have admitted the evidence of the subsequent failure to pay the payroll taxes.

More on Recklessness as Cheek Willfulness (Including for FBAR Civil Penalty) or Willful Blindness (7/22/14)

Yesterday, I wrote a blog titled Willful Blindness / Conscious Avoidance and Crimes Requiring Intent to Violate a Known Legal Duty (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 7/21/14), here.  In that blog, I concluded that willful blindness for purposes of the income tax and the FATCA willful penalty did not include gross negligence or its parallel recklessness.  A reader pointed out that the Fourth Circuit had concluded that recklessness could meet the definition of willfulness.  United States v. Williams, 489 Fed. Appx. 655; 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 15017 (4th Cir. 2012).  (For my prior blog on the Williams case, see Fourth Circuit Reverses Williams on Willfulness (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 7/20/12; revised 7/24/12), here.)  Today's blog addresses this aspect of the Williams holding.

I will focus on the FBAR side of the issue here.  The FBAR willfulness civil penalty is as follows (Section 5321(a)(5)(C), here:

(C) Willful violations.— In the case of any person willfully violating, or willfully causing any violation of, any provision of section 5314—
    (i) the maximum penalty under subparagraph (B)(i) shall be increased to the greater of—
        (I) $100,000, or
        (II) 50 percent of the amount determined under subparagraph (D), 

So, the key statutory term is willfully.  As the Courts have noted on many occasions, when Congress uses the term willfully in statutory schemes, it may mean different things.  See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, ___ (1998), here; see also former Justice Souter's opinion in  Justice Souter’s opinion in United States v. Marshall, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 10415 (1st Cir.  2014), here (“willful” is a “chameleon” which changes in tone and color according to the Code section involved and the circumstances).  However, as Cheek noted, in the federal tax criminal provisions, it means intent to violate a known legal duty, the strictest formulation of scienter for the word willfully.  Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991), here.  In Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994), here, the Supreme Court held that willfully as used in Section 5322(a), here, the criminal provision for willfully violating the antistructuring provisions, should be interpreted the same as in Cheek -- intent to violate a known legal duty.  Ratzlaf had to know that structuring was illegal and intend to violate the law in order to be prosecuted.  In the course of so holding, the Court said:

A term appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally read the same way each time it appears. See Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 479, 120 L. Ed. 2d 379, 112 S. Ct. 2589 (1992). We have even stronger cause to construe a single formulation, here § 5322(a), the same way each time it is called into play. See United States v. Aversa, 984 F.2d 493, 498 (CA1 1993) (en banc) ("Ascribing various meanings to a single iteration of [§ 5322(a)'s willfulness requirement] -- reading the word differently for each code section to which it applies -- would open Pandora's jar. If courts can render meaning so malleable, the usefulness of a single penalty provision for a group of related code sections will be eviscerated and . . . almost any code section that references a group of other code sections would become susceptible to individuated interpretation.").

The FBAR criminal penalty is in Section 5322(a) also. The FBAR civil willfullness penalty is part of the same regulatory scheme, incorporated in the immediately  preceding Code section, Section 5321.  Significantly, Section 5321(d) says that the civil penalty can apply "notwithstanding the fact that a criminal penalty is imposed with respect to the same violation."  So, referring to the above quote from Ratzlaf, willfulness for purposes of the civil penalty would have the same interpretation of willfully -- intent to violate a known legal duty.  Hence, the IRM  says that, for purposes of the FBAR civil penalty, "The test for willfulness is whether there was a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.  4.26.16.4.5.3  (07-01-2008) FBAR Willfulness Penalty - Willfulness, here.  We thus do not have to pick among possible meanings of willfully, we know the meaning of willfully.

Simon's Last Hurrah / Fizzle? (8/16/13)

I have posted before on the continuing saga of James Simon, "Certified Public Accountant, a professor of accounting, and an entrepreneur," who was convicted of "filing false income tax returns, failing to file reports of foreign bank accounts, mail fraud and financial aid fraud."  Yesterday, the Seventh Circuit rejected his appeal, thus affirming his convictions.  United States v. Simon, 727 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2013), here.  Simon was always the atypical case because of the "other crimes" involved and the egregious fact pattern.  So I am not sure what lessons it teaches except as a variation of the old saying, "Bulls make money, bears make money, pigs get slaughtered."

You get the flavor from the Seventh Circuit's summary:

For tax years 2003 through 2006, the Simon family received approximately $1.8 million from JAS Partners, Elekta, JS Elekta, Ichua and William R. Simon Farms, Inc., most of this recorded as loans in Simon's personal financial records. Simon and his family spent approximately $1.7 million during this same period of time. Yet Simon paid just $328 in income taxes for 2005, and claimed refunds for the other three years, at the same time pleading poverty to financial aid programs in order to gain need-based scholarships for his children at private schools. The government charged Simon with four counts of filing false tax returns, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; four counts of failing to file reports related to foreign bank accounts, in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5314, 5322 and 18 U.S.C. § 2; eleven counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 2; and four counts of financial aid fraud, in violation of 20 U.S.C. § 1097 and 18 U.S.C. § 2.

The Seventh Circuit summarizes the issues Simon raises on appeal:

On appeal, Simon first contends that his convictions for failing to file reports of foreign bank accounts must be reversed because he filed the required documents within the time allotted by extensions granted by the IRS. He characterizes the issue as one of conflicting interpretations of the law by the Treasury Department and the Justice Department. He maintains that the courts should defer to the agency entrusted with implementing the statute at issue, in this case the Treasury Department, and that deferring to Treasury would require reversal of those counts. Second, Simon argues that evidentiary errors and jury instruction errors require reversal of his convictions for filing false tax returns. He complains that the court's rulings in limine prevented him from presenting a valid defense to the charges when he was not allowed to present certain evidence of his basis in JAS Partners. He also challenges the government's second theory underlying the false tax return counts: that the returns were false because Simon failed to check the "yes" box on Schedule B of his return in response to a question regarding whether he had signature authority over foreign bank accounts. If the conviction on the foreign bank reporting counts must be reversed, then the conviction on the false returns must also be reversed, he argues, because it was no more necessary to check the "yes" box revealing his signature authority over foreign accounts than it was to file reports for those accounts. Third, he maintains that the evidentiary errors he asserted on the false return counts led to an error in the jury instructions. Finally, Simon contends that if the false tax return counts are reversed, then he is also entitled to a new trial on the mail fraud and student loan fraud counts, because these convictions were dependent on the validity of the false tax return convictions.

Diverting Corporate Earnings - Constructive Dividends or Wages / Salary (9/17/11)

One of the common ways of cheating on taxes is to divert corporate earnings from a C corporation to an entity that is off the IRS's radar screen. The diversions may be of the income which never hits the corporation's books and thus is not reported as income on its tax returns; they may also occur after the income is recorded with the diversion achieved by making payments from the corporation for goods or services which are deducted.  When the transactions thereafter get on the IRS's radar screen, the issue is whether the diversion was an underpayment of tax at the corporate level. 

In a wholly owned corporation, particularly a personal service corporation providing professional services, the corporate income arises from the personal services of the sole shareholder. In such a case, the corporation could easily pay the shareholder wages or salary of the entire net income before payment of compensation. (I refer to this as wages, as did the Court in the case I discuss below.) There would certainly be no unreasonable compensation issue. But, by paying the amount as wages, although fixing the tax issue at the corporate level, the income still is taxed at the shareholder level and the corporation has to withhold, payover and provide a W-2 for an easy IRS match at the shareholder level. By diverting that amount via  either diverting the income or through falsely deductible payments to a shareholder designated entity which does not pay tax, the tax cost at both the corporate and the shareholder levels are avoided (at least until caught). When caught, of course, in order to minimum the tax avoided, the corporation and the shareholder may try to claim that the diversion payments were really wages to the sole shareholder rather than dividends thereby eliminating the corporate level tax. Sometimes, when caught, the shareholder will cause the corporation to amend its returns making that claim.

More on the Simon Conviction (4/9/11)

I previously report on United States v. Simon involving convictions for four tax perjury counts (§ 7206(1)), three FBAR counts (31 U.S.C. §§ 5314, 5322), eight mail fraud counts (§ 1341), and four financial aid fraud counts (20 U.S.C. § 1097). (For my blogs on Simon, see here.)  Because of the facts and the other counts of conviction, Simon is outside the mainstream of the criminal cases being brought in the Government's current civil and criminal juggernaut against offshore account holders.

I had not previously reported the actual sentence in Simon. The sentence is 6 years. I picked up the sentence from a recent decision denying bail pending appeal. United States v. Simon, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37001 (N.D. IN 2011), here. This decision did not report the various sentencing factors, hence my spreadsheet (downloadable to the right) is incomplete.

I review here the decision on bail.

Sentencing Simon (Preliminary and Final) (3/18/11)

Note to Readers:  This blog initially discussed only the opinion on Preliminary Sentencing Findings.  I have since obtained the subsequent sentencing opinion.  I accordingly ad a link to the sentencing opinion and a short discussion of it at the end of this blog.

PRELIMINARY SENTENCING OPINION 3/14/11

Only 3 defendants have been tried recently amidst the Government's juggernaut against foreign bank accounts. All were convicted. I have previously discussed here, 2 of those defendants, father and son, who were convicted and sentenced to 40 months each. I want to talk today about the other whose prosecution, technically, did not arise from that juggernaut, but who was tried for foreign bank account violations during the ongoing juggernaut. He is James A. Simon whom I have discussed before here.

Mr. Simons' prosecution apparently arose from an investigated that predated the UBS brouhaha from whence the flurry of criminal charges arose. He had a number of criminal issues beyond just failing to report and pay tax on income stashed in foreign banks and filing the required FBAR. He did not plead and was convicted of multiple counts as will be noted.

Conviction in Foreign Account Plus Case (1/16/11)

There is a recent opinion in United States v. Simon (ND IN No. 3:10-cr-00056) \about which I previously blogger here. The new opinion is here. The new opinion, dated 1/1/11, is short and cryptic -- assuming some familiarity with earlier rulings in the case to understanding the judge's exasperation. The new opinion rejects the defendant's post trial motion for judgment of acquittal and alternative motion for new trial. The Court's opening paragraph under Background, gives the reader an indication of how the court will rule:

A 23-count indictment was handed down in April 2010, charging Mr. Simon with filing false federal income tax returns (Counts 1-4), failing to file foreign bank account reports (FBARs)(Counts 5-8), mail fraud (Counts 9-19), and fraud involving federal financial aid (Counts 20-23). More than seventeen pretrial motions required four hearings, numerous oral rulings [Doc. Nos. 25, 33, 71 and 109], and three detailed written opinions and orders [Doc. Nos. 62, 74 and 100]. Trial began on November 2, 2010. Evidentiary objections were the rule, rather than the exception, during trial, and the court frequently had to restate earlier evidentiary rulings. Mr. Simon seemed to change his theory of defense mid-trial, requiring additional briefing.

The Government dismissed Count 5, and, after trial the jury convicted on all remaining counts except Counts 13, 14 and 16 (mail fraud counts). Not a good day for Mr. Simon.

The issue I previously blogged was the Court's rejection of the claim that the IRS's extension of time for signatories on foreign accounts to file delinquent FBARs by 6/30/11 operated to preclude prosecution for the original delinquencies which, if they occurred with the required willfulness, were criminal acts at the time. In this new opinion, the Court begins its Discussion as follows:

Mr. Simon's renewed motion for judgment of acquittal is premised on arguments previously raised, considered, and rejected.

And, the Court concluded its Discussion with the following:

The court carefully considered Mr. Simon's arguments, has given detailed reasons for rejecting them, and believes that it properly ruled on each of the issues raised. Mr. Simon hasn't presented any authority or identified any error or circumstance that would warrant reconsideration at this stage of the proceedings or a new trial.

Not a good opening or closing discussion for the defendant.

There is not a whole lot in between that I think particularly worthy of note for readers of this blog. The opinion is short so it might be worth scanning by those whose interest is piqued.  I mention the case only because the underlying scheme did involve foreign accounts and foreign entity intrigues and there were FBAR count convictions. The Government has another notch under its belt in this area. But, it is clear from this and the prior opinion that this was not a garden variety foreign account case. The facts underlying the federal financial aid fraud counts makes this case quite an outlier to the cases I have encountered involving foreign accounts. I just wonder whether, if facts had not involved federal financial aid fraud, the dispute between Mr. Simon and the IRS / DOJ Tax (which also had some other predicate intrigues) could not have been resolved short of criminal prosecution.

Can Signatories Filing FBARs During the Administratively Extended FBAR Filing Period Be Prosecuted for Failure to File? (10/16/10)

Readers will recall that the IRS administratively granted U.S. persons with signatory only authority (i.e., no financial interest) relief provided they filed the FBARs first by June 30, 2010 and then by June 30, 2011. See Administrative Notice 2010-23, March 13, 2010; and Notice 2009-62, (August 31, 2009). The relief was specifically made retroactive. I think most practitioners viewed this as assurance that no untoward result would be forthcoming if the U.S. persons qualifying as signatories only filed by the extended date (now June 30, 2011).

In United States v. Simon, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108079 (ND IN 2010), the defendant was indicted for various tax crimes, including failure to file FBAR reports for several years. As to the FBAR counts, the defendant urged that he was a signatory with no financial interest and thus, having filed delinquent FBARs within the extended filing period but before indictment, qualified for the relief, so that the indictments for the FBAR violations must be dismissed. The Government argued that he had a financial interest and thus did not qualify for the relief. In any event, the Government argued, even if he qualified for the signatory relief, the contemporaneous failure each year to file by the statute's due date (June 30 of the year following) was a crime, that crime could not be forgiven by administrative pronouncement, and thus the indictment must stand.

The court agreed. The following is its reasoning:

As the government sees it, Mr. Simon doesn't qualify for relief under the IRS notices because he had a financial interest, not just signature authority, in the foreign accounts. Even if he did qualify, the government argues, administrative relief can't change any criminal liability incurred before amendment of the regulation. The government further contends that the notices haven't become final regulations under the Administrative Procedures Act, and that Congress didn't expressly grant retroactive rule-making authority to the Treasury Department under Title 31. Mr. Simon's January 2010 filing of FBARs for 2005-2007, the government says, doesn't absolve him of criminal liability because under the regulations existing at the time the FBARs had to be filed by June 30 of the following year (June 30 of 2006, 2007, and 2008). The government also notes that Mr. Simon never filed an FBAR for 2003 or 2004.

In reply, Mr. Simon argues that he doesn't have a financial interest in Ichua, JS Elekta or Elekta, that 31 C.F.R. § 103.55 gives the Treasury Secretary authority to make exceptions to the reporting requirements, that the exceptions made by the administrative notices were expressly retroactive, and that he wasn't required to file a FBAR for 2004 because the account balance was less than $10,000. No documentation supports his factual assertions.

Whether Mr. Simon had a financial interest in a foreign account is a matter for resolution at trial, not on pretrial motions. The court agrees with the government, though, that if Mr. Simon committed a crime by failing to file an FBAR when the regulations required him to do so, a later regulatory amendment can't absolve him of criminal liability without retroactive modification of the underlying statute. See United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531, 64 S. Ct. 359, 88 L. Ed. 290 (1944); United States v. Uni Oil, Inc., 710 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th Cir. 1983); City & County of Denver v. Bergland, 695 F.2d 465, 480 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Resnick, 455 F.2d 1127, 1134 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d 779, 784 (E.D. Va. 2009). The statute hasn't been changed.

Mr. Simon argues that the government is mistaken because none of these cases (or the several others the government cites) involved expressly retroactive regulations. Mr. Simon's description of the cited cases is accurate, but the court disagrees with Mr. Simon as to where that distinction leads. To agree with Mr. Simon that a regulation's self-declaration of retroactivity requires a different outcome would be to hold that an agency acquires the power to forgive crimes already committed by simply declaring its intent to exercise that power. The cited cases teach that even if an agency's regulations becomes intertwined in a crime's definition, it is Congress and not the agency that creates the crime, and only Congress can forgive the crime. See also United States v. U.S. Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 737-38, 91 S. Ct. 1041, 28 L. Ed. 2d 434 (1971); Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535, 553-555, 74 S. Ct. 745, 98 L. Ed. 933 (1954); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 332, 57 S. Ct. 216, 81 L. Ed. 255 (1936).

The court denies Mr. Simon's motion to dismiss counts 5 through 8 of the indictment.

I am concerned about this analysis. I think most practitioners working in the voluntary disclosure area have felt comforted by the Notices that the filings by the extended date of June 30, 2011 would solve any criminal problem for signatories. The Court says no; the Government can choose to prosecute despite the Notices.

Of course, there are potential defenses that one might invoke to perhaps prevent the Government from relying upon the FBARs thus elicited from U.S. persons with apparent assurance that all is and will be well.

Of course, the whole issue is really moot in the case if the defendant really had a financial interest rather than just a signatory interest (which appears likely reading between the lines). But, quite frankly, I am still concerned about the Court's holding that a signatory who files by the extended filing date can still be prosecuted.

Any thoughts from readers?

The Daugerdas Indictment - Part #4 - The Lie (6/16/09)

I have blogged before that tax shelter prosecutions are about the lie. Often, the claim is that the tax shelters lack economic substance, but in these prosecutions the real complaint is the lie that is designed to give an appearance of economic substance. The jury will not understand the complex, convoluted tax structure and byzantine legal analysis, but the jury will understand the lie. In this blog, I will look principally at the indictment's claims as to the big lie. I caution readers that I address here only my understanding of the Government's unilateral claims about the lie in the indictment. I make no attempt here to develop nuance or present defenses to those claims that the defendants may have.

The Big Lie

The big lie is the taxpayers' representations that they had a nontax business reason for participating in the shelter. "In truth and fact," the indictment asserts repeatedly, the taxpayers participated in order to achieve the touted artificial tax benefit and not for a nontax business reason (sometimes the indictment alleges "substantial" nontax business reason). And, in truth and fact, the promoters knew the taxpayers' real tax motivation, despite their formalistic reliance on the taxpayers' "representations" of business reason.