Briefly, the facts are that the defendant is a disbarred attorney who, the Government alleged did some bad things, much of which were not necessarily tax crimes but were other crimes and skullduggery. The defendant had known for a long time that he was under criminal investigation and his life otherwise seems to have been falling apart. So, the Government requested that the indictment be sealed until he was arrested, in order to avoid giving him that information that might cause him to flee. The Magistrate Judge sealed the indictment. The defendant was arrested, and the indictment was unsealed. The issue in the case is whether the Government had properly justified its request to seal the indictment. The defendant complained about the sealing, and moved to dismiss the indictment. The Court denied the motion to dismiss. I offer by cut and paste the entire Discussion in the Memorandum and Order (I supply the bold-faced to draw readers attention to certain portions).
McBride argues that the government violated Rule 6(e)(4) when it moved to seal the indictment without asserting that he posed a risk of flight or providing any other justification. Further, McBride claims that his arrest constituted an "unreasonable seizure" of his person in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Fed. R. Crim. P. 9 because the warrant was not "properly supported" by a risk of flight. According to McBride, the remedy for these violations is dismissal of the indictment. The government states it requested that the indictment be sealed to secure custody of the defendant.
Rule 6(e)(4) states: "The magistrate judge to whom an indictment is returned may direct that the indictment be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has been released pending trial." Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(4). The First Circuit has held that "Rule 6(e) rests on the premise that criminal defendants not yet in custody may elude arrest upon learning of their indictment. . . . [T]he government need not articulate its reasons for requesting that an indictment be sealed, so long as its request is based on a ground set forth in Rule 6(e)." United States v. Balsam, 203 F.3d 72, 81 (1st Cir. 2000). Risk of flight is not the only basis for sealing an indictment. For example, sealing an indictment to protect a key prosecution witness qualifies as a "legitimate prosecutorial objective". Id.
McBride argues that there is no evidence he posed a risk of flight, pointing out that his whereabouts are well known and he has attended proceedings regularly in Bankruptcy Court. He points out that he has no passport, and has extensive family ties here. The government does not concede that there was no risk of flight, noting: "The government was aware of information about McBride that reasonably raised concerns about a potential risk of flight, including the following: McBride had been disbarred in 2005 after decades of practice; he had filed for bankruptcy in 2009; he had recently lost both of his multi-million dollar homes in Marblehead and Edgartown; he had concealed from his bankruptcy trustee his efforts to fraudulently re-finance his Edgartown property; he had engaged in fraud, fabricated documents, forged signatures, and recorded fraudulent documents at two registries of deeds; and he had recently admitted to sufficient facts on multiple state charges involving identity fraud, credit card fraud and practicing law while disbarred."