I have posted before about rich taxpayers trying to avoid / evade payment of tax by "investing" in bullshit tax shelters. (Investing is a euphemism for creating a façade in the guise of an investment without risk and reward to cheat on tax.) The play all along was to create a smokescreen in which the taxpayer hoped to win the audit lottery. The enablers in those shelters -- often big accounting and law firms and foreign banks -- were paid handsomely to generate the smoke.
In those cases where the IRS discovered the shenanigans, it audited if it thought the statute of limitations was still open and assessed tax accordingly. The taxpayer lost the lottery. As is human nature, the taxpayers wanted a scapegoat to ease the consequences of their own misconduct. So, the only scapegoat around to sue was the enablers, many of whom had very deep pockets. I have written occasionally about those suits before, for the courts in some cases did not appear sympathetic to making one skulldugger pay another skulldugger. See e.g.,
The Role and Culpability of the Taxpayers Participating in Bullshit Tax Shelters (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 5/4/14),
here, and
Taxpayer Playing the Bullshit Tax Shelter Game Tries to Shift Blame to the Enablers (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 1/16/14),
here.
I report today on another attempt by the taxpayer to shift his own blame to an enabler. In
GG Capital v. Deutsche Bank, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59540 (CD CA 4/28/14),
here, the court dismissed the claims for being untimely under civil cause of action statute of limitations. Most claims in U.S. law have a statute of limitations. Sometimes the statute of limitations "tolls" until the taxpayer has either discovered or had reason to discover the conduct underlying the claim. This is known as the discovery rule. The court applied that rule to pour the defendant out.
The particular bullshit tax shelter was one apparently hawked by David Greenberg, although his precise role is not made totally clear in the case. For purposes of the case, the Court seems to treat Greenberg as the representative of the taxpayer vis-a-vis the transactions in issue. By way of background, Greenberg was among the crowd of 19 defendants in the first big tax shelter prosecution related to KPMG, United States v. Stein (SDNY), in 2005. The common core of the prosecution was bullshit tax shelters hawked by KPMG and certain related enablers. Greenberg, associated with KPMG during some of the relevant period, was among the defendants because of, in part, some "off the books" -- at least off KPMG's books and allegedly unknown to KPMG -- shelters. The shelter in GG Capital may have been one of that he hawked or sponsored independently.
The shelter was the digital options shelter which paired long and short options to eliminate, practically, any risk because of their offsetting nature (if the long fell in value, the short would rise and vice-versa), so that with the possibility of risk practically eliminated, the possibility of gain was likewise eliminated, at least practically. (This is an economic variation of the mantra, no pain, no gain.) This variation of the SOB shelter was, in other contexts, called the Short Option Strategy or SOS.
The shelter taxpayer "bought" required financial transactions in exceedingly large amounts, the amount of which were offset by the leveraged nature of the offsetting positions, permitting the taxpayers to enter the transactions with very little down and, as noted, very little, if any, risk to anyone -- the taxpayers or the financial institution sitting on the offsetting positions for the taxpayer.
According to the taxpayer's allegations, when hawking their role in the deal to the taxpayer, Deutsche Bank represented that the financial transactions (options) were appropriately based on the Black-Scholes formula, with the probability of hitting a "sweet spot" was between 0.051 and 0.091, depending on the option pairing. For that alleged represented sweet spot opportunity, taxpayer paid the enablers really big bucks, further impairing the possibility that the long-shot sweet spot could return their costs, much less produce a cash-on-cash profit justifying the costs. Without a taxpayer profit motive for the transactions, the taxpayer could not claim the alleged tax benefits. So, the taxpayer alleged that he had the profit motive based on what Deutsche Bank represented. But, the taxpayer alleges, Deutsche Bank's representations were lies and that he did not have reason to know they were lies until later, within the discovery period for the statute of limitations.