Wednesday, August 31, 2022

Sixth Circuit Holds Harmless Error to Not Give Correct Jury Instruction on Evasion Statute of Limitations (8/31/22)

In United States v. Pieron (6th Cir. 8/30/22), Unpublished, CA 6 here and GS here. the Court affirmed Pieron’s tax evasion conviction. Although nonprecedential, I think the opinion offers a lesson for practitioners. I, therefore, report on what the Court described (Slip Op. 4) as “Pieron’s more serious argument” that the trial court failed to give a “correctly stated” jury instruction that the jury was required to find an affirmative act of evasion in the six-year limitations period.

The evidence at trial included some acts that could permit the jury to find an affirmative act of evasion. Some of those acts were outside the six-year period; some were within the six-year period. Pieron argued that the trial judge, through the correctly stated proposed instruction, should have focused the jury on the requirement that the jury find an affirmative act in the limitations period. The trial judge refused the correct instruction. The conviction of evasion means that the jury found at least one affirmative act of evasion, but the absence of the correct instruction means that there is no way to determine if the jury found at least one act of evasion in the limitations period. The Sixth Circuit found the error harmless, citing evidence of acts in the record that could have been persuasive to the jury had the trial court properly instructed the jury.

The Fifth Circuit’s analysis is short, one paragraph spanning parts of two pages (Slip Op. 4-5), so I just quote it in its entirety:

            That same conclusion defeats Pieron’s more serious argument, which is that the district court should have instructed the jury that it could convict Pieron only if it found that he committed an evasive act within the five-year limitations period, meaning after January 9, 2012. Most of the actions alleged in the government’s Bill of Particulars took place before that date; Pieron’s proposed instruction correctly stated that, “[t]o be guilty of the crime alleged, the defendant must have committed an affirmative act of tax evasion after January 9, 2012”; and that instruction likely would have focused both the jury’s attention and the parties’ presentations at trial. But we conclude that any error as to the district court’s failure to give the instruction was harmless. See generally Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 414 (2010); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). In closing arguments, the government emphasized the 433-F forms that Pieron filed in 2012 and 2014. Those forms, as discussed above, were patently misleading; and Pieron made little effort to persuade the jury otherwise during trial and particularly during his closing argument. True, in closing arguments, the government also emphasized several instances of evasive conduct before January 9, 2012. But we see no reason to think that the jury might have overlooked his 2012 and 2014 433-F forms or otherwise found them non-evasive. Moreover, in the context of the trial record as a whole, the jury had every reason to think that Pieron’s August 2012 Foreign Bank Account Report (in which he claimed a $250,000 maximum balance for a Swiss account that held $750,000 during the relevant year) was evasive as well. The government has shown by a preponderance of evidence that the district court’s decision not to give Pieron’s proposed instruction neither affected nor “substantially swayed” the verdict. See United States v. Kettles, 970 F.3d 637, 643 (6th Cir. 2020). The omission of that instruction therefore does not entitle Pieron to a new trial.

Sunday, August 28, 2022

Senate Press Release and Report on Offshore Evasion Through Shell Banks Skirting FATCA (8/28/22)

Senator Wyden led a major Senate Finance Committee investigation that produced a press release and report about use of “shell bank” to avoid the FATCA reporting requirements.  See the press release titled Wyden Investigation Uncovers Major Loophole In Offshore Account Reporting, here, and the report titled The Shell Bank Loophole, here.  The press release offers a good summary of the report (see particularly the “Key Findings” in the press release).

The following are summaries of the key points that readers of this blog may be interested in:

1. The gambit requires that the shell bank be registered with the IRS.  The press release says that establishing a shell bank with foreign accounts that do not get reported to the IRS is simple:

The key steps:

1. Establish a shell company in a FATCA partner jurisdiction, even those in well-known tax haven jurisdictions like Bermuda or the British Virgin Islands.

2. Submit IRS form 8957 to register the shell company as a foreign financial institution and obtain a Global Intermediary Identification Number (GIIN).

3. Open an account at a bank in Switzerland, or other FATCA partner jurisdiction, in the name of the shell company now registered as a financial institution. Use an attorney or other intermediary as the signatory of the account.

4. Invest in private equity firms or other investment vehicles and direct the fund manager to wire proceeds from investment activities in the United States to the shell company’s account in Switzerland or elsewhere.

The results:

•  The Swiss bank is no longer required to report that the account is held by U.S. persons because the account is held in the name of an entity with a valid GIIN number. The Swiss bank is also no longer required to conduct due diligence to determine whether the account has a U.S. nexus.

•  The shell company is now operating as a “shell bank” and can self-certify reporting offshore accounts to IRS for FATCA purposes.

•  In the absence of an audit or other federal investigation, is it highly unlikely the IRS will detect whether these accounts are concealing or underreporting assets held by U.S. persons.

More on Tax Due and Owing and Tax Deficiency (8/28/22)

In United States v. Green, 47 F. 4th 279, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 23750 (5th Cir. 8/24/22), CA5 here and GS here, the Court affirmed convictions of (i) John Green (an attorney) and Thomas Selgas for defraud conspiracy and (ii) Selgas for tax evasion.

I don't think there is anything new in the case or that the opinion presents old law in a way that even justifies making the opinion a published opinion.  Of course, the Fifth Circuit standards for publishing an opinion are not particularly high.  See generally Precedential Effect of Published Plurality Appellate Opinion That Majority of Panel Doesn't Accept (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 8/9/22), here (addressing a published Fifth Circuit opinion that 2 members of the panel disagreed with and thus was not precedent).)

There is one item that I have expressed concern about before – describing the "tax due and owing" element for evasion as "tax deficiency." (See Slip Op. 14-18.)  The Green opinion describes the evasion element as "tax deficiency," although the Court says (Slip Op. 14) that it is "also referred to in the caselaw as a 'tax due and owing.'"

I continue to be concerned about use of the term tax deficiency for the tax due and owing element for tax evasion.  I prefer the term "evaded tax" to describe the element, but the common term is "tax due and owing." Rather than recreate the wheel in describing my concern, I quote from my article, John A. Townsend, Tax Evaded in the Federal Tax Crimes Sentencing Process and Beyond, 59 Vill. L. Rev. 599 (2014), here.  In the article, I have a section discussing Tax Liability Concepts in the Criminal Tax Universe (pp. 602-611).  In that section, I discuss Civil Tax Liability and Tax Deficiency (pp. 603-604), The Tax the Taxpayer Intended to Evade - The Criminal Tax Numbers or Figures (pp. 604-606) and the Sentencing Tax Loss (pp. 606-608).  Here is the most relevant portion of the article (pp. 604-608, some footnotes omitted):

2. The Tax the Taxpayer Intended to Evade - The Criminal Tax Numbers or Figures

            I think it helpful to illustrate the concepts in an example. Assume that, for civil tax purposes, the taxpayer had $ 100,000 of income that the taxpayer failed to report and pay. Assume that the tax liability on that omitted income is $ 35,000; that liability is the deficiency. The $ 100,000 omitted income consists of two items - $ 50,000 of embezzlement income which the taxpayer knew was taxable and chose not to report and $ 50,000 of personal injury income that the taxpayer thought or could have reasonably thought was excludable under section 104 but which, for technical reasons, is not properly excludable under that section. In calculating the tax evaded as an element of tax evasion, the Government will compute the tax only on the $ 50,000 of embezzlement income and will not include the $ 50,000 of personal injury income. So, let's say the tax on $ 50,000 of embezzlement income is $ 17,500. The criminal tax number for establishing the evaded tax element in a tax evasion case is $ 17,500 (even though the deficiency is $ 35,000). The Government must prove the evaded tax beyond a reasonable doubt.

Wednesday, August 17, 2022

Government Files FBAR Collection Suit for FBAR Willful Penalties Aggregating $23,102,381 (Plus Interest and Costs) (8/17/22; 8/18/22)

In United States v. Nadji (D. Colo. Case No. 1:22-cv-02070), CL dkt entries here, the Government filed an FBAR collection complaint on 8/15/22. The complaint is here. The complaint requests (¶ 55, p. 8) judgment

for $23,102,381 in willful FBAR penalties, $2,631,772.60 in accrued and assessed late payment penalties, and $877,257.53 of interest, plus costs of collection, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3717, as  of  August 11, 2022. The United States is entitled to recover $26,611,411.13, plus interest, penalties, and costs accruing from August 11, 2022.

According to the complaint:

1. The amounts are significant.

2. Nadji was born in Iran in 1944. While educated in part in the U.S., he “moved back to the United States and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1992.”

3. Nadji was wealthy, deriving his wealth from an Iranian engineering company he owned 100%. Nadji paid no tax on income from the company, either in the U.S. or Iran.

4. He had interests in four foreign bank accounts from 2009 to 2012.  

5. During those years, his U.S. returns were prepared by a tax preparer in Colorado. However, he did not disclose his foreign accounts to the tax preparer.

6. In 2014, he entered the 2014 OVDI, disclosing the four accounts and filing delinquent FBARS for 2008-2012. The complaint has a table listing the amounts Nadji reported on the FBARS for the high balances in each account for the years and aggregating the high balances for each year. 

7. The IRS removed Nadji from OVDI because he disagreed with the final closing package. I infer that his disagreement was, at least in part, with the OVDI penalty amount (which I think was 27.5% for the high year in the covered period). I presume further that he filed delinquent income tax returns and paid the resulting taxes, penalties and interest.

Saturday, August 13, 2022

An Interpretive Battle Among Textualists Judges Over Statute Criminalizing False Liens Against U.S. Officers or Employees (8/13/22)

In United States v. Pate, 43 F.4th 1268 (11th Cir. 8/10/22), CA11 here and GS here, the majority opinion sets up the issue decided in the opening paragraph:

            Title 18 U.S.C. § 1521 prohibits the filing of a false lien or encumbrance against the property of any officer or employee of the United States “on account of the performance of official duties.” In 2018, Timothy Jermaine Pate filed various false liens against John Koskinen, the former Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, and Jacob Lew, the former Secretary of the Treasury. There is no dispute that Pate filed the false liens to retaliate against Lew and Koskinen for acts they performed as part of their official duties. The twist here, and what makes this a case of first impression for this Court, is that Pate filed the false liens after Lew and Koskinen had left their positions with the federal government. We therefore are presented with the following question: Does § 1521 apply to false liens filed against former federal officers and employees for official actions they performed while in service with the federal government? We conclude that the answer to this question is yes—the plain language of § 1521 covers both current and former federal officers and employees. Thus, for the reasons discussed below, and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm Pate’s convictions predicated on violations of § 1521.

The majority (Judge Lagoa with Judge Branch joining) and dissenting (Judge Newsom) opinions engage over interpretation of a criminal statute.  The three judges are Trump appointees and, not surprisingly, members of the Federalist Society, which permits an inference that they are textualists, an inference confirmed by the opinions.  The majority opinion claims that its decision is based on the plain language of the statute, reasonably interpreted of course.  The dissent claims that the plain language, as it reads the text, does not support the majority.  Both sides rely on parts of the work of the master textualist and sloganeer, Justice Scalia.  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012).  Both sides deploy dictionaries, judicial sound bites, and slogans to justify the differing conclusions, with each side accusing the other of not being good textualists.  Of course, we should not expect a uniform meaning of textualism, so I suppose this type of difference is not surprising. And we should recognize that there is sufficient play in the joints of textualism to permit judges to reach their preferred conclusions.  

I think the majority has the better side of the engagement of giving a reasonable interpretation to the text.

Wednesday, August 10, 2022

Government Motion in Kepke Case to Exclude Expert Testimony About the Law (8/10/22)

I picked up an argument in a Government Motion to Exclude Defendant’s Proffered Expert Witness in the Kepke prosecution, United States v. Kepke (N.D. Cal. Criminal No. 3:21-CR-00155-JD), Motion dated 8/5/22, here. In general, the Government claims that Kepke’s expert witness disclosures were too cryptic to understand the expert witness’s proffered testimony, but the Government inferred that the expert witness would improperly testify about the law. Here are the three key paragraphs I focus on (Motion pp, 7-9):

             Expert witnesses are not permitted to offer opinions consisting of their interpretation of the law. See Hangarter v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1018 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ., Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053, 1066 n. 10 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Barabin v. AstenJohnson, Inc., 740 F.3d 457, 467 (9th Cir. 2014)); see also Snap-Drape, Inc. v. Comm’r, 98 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1996). “[I]instructing the jury as to the applicable law is the distinct and exclusive province of the court.” Nationwide Transp. Fin. V. Cass Info. Sys., Inc., 523, F.3d 1051, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Caputo, 517 F.3d 935, 942 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The only legal expert in a federal courtroom is the judge.”); United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1287 (9th Cir. 1993); CZ Services, Inc. v. Express Scripts Holding Co., 3:18-cv-04217-JD, 2020 WL 4518978, at * 2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2020) (“[L]egal opinions are not the proper subject of expert testimony. Reed v. Lieurance, 863 F.3d 1196, 1209 (9th Cir. 2017). An expert may not give opinions that are legal conclusions, United States v. Tamman, 782 F.3d 543, 552-53 (9th Cir. 2015), or attempt to advise the jury on the law, Strong v. Valdez Fine Foods, 724 F.3d 1042, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 2013).”).

            In at least one criminal tax case, the Ninth Circuit approved expert testimony about the law where “the theory of the defense [was] that there [was] a good faith dispute as to the interpretation of the tax laws.” See United States v. Clardy, 612 F.2d 1139, 1153 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1979) (distinguished by United States v. Burton, 737 F.2d 439, 444 (5th Cir. 1984)). But that does not mean that legal evidence is automatically admissible in all criminal tax trials. To the contrary, courts regularly exclude legal experts in criminal tax cases. See, e.g., United States v. Boulware, 558 F.3d 971, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming exclusion of expert testimony that specific “corporate distributions were legally non-taxable” as an impermissible legal opinion); see also United States v. Curtis, 782 F.2d 593, 598-600 (6th Cir. 1996) (affirming exclusion of expert testimony and distinguishing Garber); United States v. Harris, 942 F.2d 1125, 1132 n.6 (7th Cir. 1991) (evidence “may include expert testimony about case law, to the extent that the defendant claims actual reliance on that case law. Case law on which the defendant did not in fact rely is irrelevant because only the defendant’s subjective belief is at issue.”); United States v. Ingredient Tech. Corp., 698 F.2d 88, 96-97 (2d Cir. 1983) (affirming exclusion of expert testimony and distinguishing Garber); United States v. Alessa, 3:19-cr-00010, 2021 WL 4498638, at *4 (D. Nev. Sept. 30, 2021) (evidence of a conflict in the law is irrelevant if Defendant was not aware of the conflict).

            Here, Mr. Read’s proposed testimony must be excluded because, reading between the lines (as we must because the disclosures do not reveal Mr. Read’s actual opinions), it seems likely that Mr. Read plans to testify about his understanding of the law. At best, Mr. Read’s opinion that certain offshore structures are permissible or even common is tantamount to testimony that, in his opinion, Defendant’s actions were legal. This is exactly the type of opinion that is prohibited under Ninth Circuit law because “‘[w]hen an expert undertakes to tell the jury what result to reach, this does not aid the jury in making a  decision, but rather attempts to substitute the expert’s judgment for the jury’s.’” United States v. Diaz, 876 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1994)). And any minor probative value the proffered testimony might have would be substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, and misleading the jury.

Saturday, August 6, 2022

Brockman, Defendant in Pending Major Tax Crimes Case, Dies (8/6/22)

As readers of this blog and other blogs and news in general know, the Government has been pursuing a major tax crimes case against Robert Brockman.  See One Big Fish Indicted and Lesser Big Fish Achieves NPA for Cooperation (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 10/16/20), here; and Brockman Found Competent to Stand Trial (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 5/24/22), here.  

Brockman died late yesterday, Friday, June 5.  See David Voreacos and Neil Weinberg, Robert Brockman, Software Developer Who Fought IRS, Dies at 81 (Bloomberg 8/6/22), here (highly recommended).   This moots the criminal case, but the civil side (involving both administrative investigations and civil cases) will continue.

One of the IRS civil initiatives that continues is a jeopardy assessment (meaning an assessment made for a tax normally requiring a notice of deficiency and opportunity to litigate in the Tax Court before assessment).  I discuss jeopardy assessments in my Federal Tax Procedure Book (2022 Practitioner Edition) beginning at p. 503. (The book may be downloaded at the links provided here.)  A jeopardy assessment permits a taxpayer assessed to bring an expedited proceeding in the district court, and Brockman has done so.  Brockman v. United States (S.D. Tex. Case No. 4:22-cv-00202), Courtlistener docket entries here.  According to the docket entries, oral argument was held on 8/3/22 (Dkt. #56 & 57) and the Court notified of the death on 8/6/22 (Dkt. #59).  (I could not find on PACER a similar notice to the Court, but the same Judge is assigned to both cases; the CourtListener docket entries for the criminal case are here.)

Brockman also has a case pending in the Tax Court.  Brockman v. Commissioner (T.C. Docket #764-22), here.  The documents in the case are not available on the U.S. Tax Court DAWSON web site.  All that has happened in that case is Brockman’s filing of the Petition, the IRS’ Answer, and Brockman’s Reply to Answer.

Wednesday, August 3, 2022

2022 Editions of Federal Tax Procedure Book Online at SSRN (8/3/22)

The Federal Tax Procedure Book Editions (Student and Practitioner) are available on SSRN for viewing or downloading.  The links for the editions are on the FTP Blog page in the right-hand column titled "Federal Tax Procedure Book (2022 Editions)," here,

Please note that related items are available on the pages linked in the right-hand column of this Blog.