I recently posted on the tip of the iceberg of motions from persons incarcerated in federal prisons based on the risks from the coronavirus pandemic. Compassionate Release from Incarceration Based on COVID-19 Pandemic (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 4/20/20; 5/7/20), here. I particularly focused on the types of incarcerated persons which I feature in this blog -- persons convicted of tax or related crimes (or sometimes the broader category of white collar crime). (Today, I added to that earlier blog a reference and link to Peter's Reilly excellent offering from yesterday, Judge Urges Prison Furlough For Author Of “Biggest Tax Fraud Ever” (Forbes 5/6/20), here; highly recommended.)
I have been watching a recent case, United States v. Pursley (S.D. Tex. No. H-18-575) (Courtlistener docket entries here). I have written on that case in a couple of blogs that I link at the end of this blog entry. For present purposes, the key information is that, in September 2019, Pursley, a lawyer, was convicted of tax crimes. The judge denied the Government's motion to remand Pursley to custody. There were standard post-trial motions (e.g., new trial and acquittal) which were denied. Sentencing was originally set for December 2019. Sentencing has been postponed and rescheduled several times and is currently scheduled for July 27, 2020.
In order to set up the anomaly I offer today, I will assume that Pursley is sentenced to 5 years incarceration. While he is awaiting sentencing in July 2019, he presumably has been in self-isolation at least to some degree because of the pandemic. That period of self-isolation, which has some characteristics of incarceration, will not count towards his sentence.
However, if he had been sentenced before the pandemic (say before February 2020), he might have had a shot for compassionate release or furlough if his personal characteristics and conditions of incarceration supported release or furlough. Since, for the reasons noted by Judge Pauley in the Daugerdas case (see my blog entry above and Peter Reilly's blog entry), it is not likely that he would get compassionate release, he might get a furlough which might at least mean that he could serve some of his incarceration period in a type of home confinement (somewhat analogous to pandemic self-isolation) which, I would think, beats prison.
Showing posts with label Incarceration-Compassionate Release. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Incarceration-Compassionate Release. Show all posts
Thursday, May 7, 2020
Monday, April 20, 2020
Compassionate Release from Incarceration Based on COVID-19 Pandemic (4/20/20; 5/7/20)
This blog entry was updated on 5/4/20 to add a short notice discussion of Paul Daugerdas' denial of compassionate release in paragraph 5 below; and on 5/7/20 to add a reference and link to Peter Reilly's blog on the Daugerdas matter.
The Procedurally Taxing Blog has an excellent posting today on the compassionate release of a notorious tax criminal, Morris Zukerman. Leslie Book, Court Grants Compassionate Release to High Profile Tax Felon Morris Zukerman (Procedurally Taxing Blog 4/20/20), here. The blog entry discusses the Court’s granting Zukerman release because of his physical characteristics (75 years old, diabetes, hypertension and obesity) and close physical incarceration with other inmates that might make him particularly susceptible to COVID-19 infection and serious consequences.
Since I have never before considered the compassionate release provision, 18 USC § 3582, and have not done any independent research, I refer readers to the PT Blog entry linked above, which also has a link to the decision granting Zukerman the release.
JAT Comments:
1. I wonder whether this and related decisions granting compassionate release in the age of COVID-19 will open the floodgates of such requests for those who, sometimes with the aid of their attorneys, conjure up some special characteristics. (See paragraph 4 below discussing the Valentino habeas corpus proceeding.)
2. I wonder whether the Court’s reacted too hastily to the exhaustion requirement. As often with seeking relief from Government agencies, the statute requires that the incarcerated person first seek relief from the agency. Zukerman did seek that relief but, rather than waiting for an answer to his request or the passage of 30 days, he filed the court proceeding three days after the request. Had that process been allowed, perhaps the Bureau of Prisons could have found some accommodation to meet at least some of the concerns claimed by Zukerman. But, the court just blew past the exhaustion requirement based on his physical characteristics, the conditions of his incarceration and the COVID-19 pandemic. In my posting earlier today, I said: "(Presumably, the Bureau of Prisons had time in the court proceedings to offer the court its views as to why it believed Zukerman were not at disproportionate risk.)" I have just reviewed Zukerman's letter response to the Government's opposition, CourtListener here, and quote from it on this issue (pp. 2-3):
The Procedurally Taxing Blog has an excellent posting today on the compassionate release of a notorious tax criminal, Morris Zukerman. Leslie Book, Court Grants Compassionate Release to High Profile Tax Felon Morris Zukerman (Procedurally Taxing Blog 4/20/20), here. The blog entry discusses the Court’s granting Zukerman release because of his physical characteristics (75 years old, diabetes, hypertension and obesity) and close physical incarceration with other inmates that might make him particularly susceptible to COVID-19 infection and serious consequences.
Since I have never before considered the compassionate release provision, 18 USC § 3582, and have not done any independent research, I refer readers to the PT Blog entry linked above, which also has a link to the decision granting Zukerman the release.
JAT Comments:
1. I wonder whether this and related decisions granting compassionate release in the age of COVID-19 will open the floodgates of such requests for those who, sometimes with the aid of their attorneys, conjure up some special characteristics. (See paragraph 4 below discussing the Valentino habeas corpus proceeding.)
2. I wonder whether the Court’s reacted too hastily to the exhaustion requirement. As often with seeking relief from Government agencies, the statute requires that the incarcerated person first seek relief from the agency. Zukerman did seek that relief but, rather than waiting for an answer to his request or the passage of 30 days, he filed the court proceeding three days after the request. Had that process been allowed, perhaps the Bureau of Prisons could have found some accommodation to meet at least some of the concerns claimed by Zukerman. But, the court just blew past the exhaustion requirement based on his physical characteristics, the conditions of his incarceration and the COVID-19 pandemic. In my posting earlier today, I said: "(Presumably, the Bureau of Prisons had time in the court proceedings to offer the court its views as to why it believed Zukerman were not at disproportionate risk.)" I have just reviewed Zukerman's letter response to the Government's opposition, CourtListener here, and quote from it on this issue (pp. 2-3):
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