In addition to the Order, linked above, the following documents might be interesting to readers of this blog:
- Complaint, here.
- Joint Rule 27(f) Report (related to discovery), here.
- U.S. Motion to Dismiss, here.
- Memorandum in Support of U.S. Motion to Dismiss, here.
- Kenteras' Opposition to U.S. Motion to Dismiss, here.
- U.S. Reply to Kenteras' Opposition, here.
I cut and paste the facts underlying the order as presented in the Order:
2. RELEVANT FACTS
The relevant facts are drawn from Plaintiffs' complaint. The Bank Secrecy Act ("BSA"), 31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq., requires U.S. citizens to keep records and file reports when they "mak[e] a transaction or maintai[n] a relation with a foreign financial agency." 31 U.S.C. § 5314(a). The report must be made in an FBAR, which is IRS Form TD F 90-22.1. The FBAR must be filed on or before June 30 of the year following the calendar year for which the report is made. If the individual fails to comply with the requirements of Section 5314, the BSA provides that civil penalties may be imposed. Id. § 5321(a)(5). For non-willful violations, the penalty cannot exceed $10,000. Id. § 5321(a)(5)(B)(I).
In 1984, Plaintiff Milo Kentera inherited money located in a foreign bank account at Banque Cantonale de Geneve ("BCGE"). He added his wife's name to the BCGE account shortly thereafter. The balance in the account increased dramatically in 2007 due to the sale of Milo Kentera's parents' property in Montenegro, certain proceeds of which were distributed to Milo and deposited in the BCGE account.
Plaintiffs have consistently disclosed the BCGE account on their federal income tax returns since 1984. However, in 2006 their accountant failed to prepare or file an FBAR in connection with their federal income tax return. Their accountant for tax years 2007, 2008, and 2009 made the same error, despite having information from which he could have discovered the existence of the BCGE account. In 2010, a third accountant acknowledged the existence of the BCGE account in Plaintiffs' return, but again seems to have failed to prepare or file an FBAR.
In February 2011, the IRS announced a federal amnesty program for taxpayers with foreign bank accounts—the 2011 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative ("OVDI"). To participate, taxpayers were required to amend their tax returns and file FBARs for tax years 2003-2010. OVDI participants were required to pay all delinquent taxes, interest, and penalties, and, under this program, taxpayers were subject to a 25% penalty on the highest aggregate account balance on their previously undisclosed accounts during those years.
In around September 2011, Plaintiffs applied to the OVDI program. They amended their tax returns for 2006-2010 to include omitted income and filed completed FBARs for 2005-2010. In August 2013, the IRS provided Plaintiffs with a Form 906, Closing Agreement on Final Determination Covering Specific Matters (the "Closing Agreement"). The Closing Agreement provided, in relevant part, that Plaintiffs would be liable under the tax code for a miscellaneous penalty of $90,092. Plaintiffs withdrew from the OVDI program the next month.
After Plaintiffs withdrew from the program, IRS agent Kimberly Nguyen ("Nguyen"), who works in Milwaukee, examined the matter and recommended that Plaintiffs be assessed non-willful FBAR penalties pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5). The amounts of the penalties were as follows:
(1)Lois Kentera: $500 for calendar year 2006; and $2,500 per year for calendar years 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, for a total penalty of $10,500; and
(2) Milo Kentera: $500 for calendar year 2006; and $10,000 per year for calendar years 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, for a total penalty of $40,500.
On September 17, 2014, the government mailed each Plaintiff a letter advising that the IRS was proposing assessment of these penalties.
On or about December 14, 2014, Plaintiffs' counsel communicated with Nguyen, protesting the proposed penalties. He also had a conference with her sometime thereafter. By letter dated April 22, 2015, the government mailed Milo Kentera a letter of an "appeals determination," upholding the IRS' proposed FBAR penalties. A similar letter was sent to Lois Kentera on April 29, 2015.
In their complaint, Plaintiffs assert that the government was wrong to assess these penalties. First, Plaintiffs contend that the BSA prohibits the imposition of an FBAR penalty if the violation was "due to reasonable cause." 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(B)(ii)(I). According to Plaintiffs, reasonable cause for their violations exists because the fault lay with their various accountants. The government disregarded this defense, and Plaintiffs believe this was a violation of their due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. Second, Plaintiffs allege that because the IRS wrongfully rejected their reasonable cause defense under the BSA, its assessment of the penalties was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (a district court may set aside agency action that is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law"). Plaintiffs request that the Court find that the government abused its discretion in assessing these penalties and ask that the Court declare the penalties void.JAT Note: the Court apparently took the facts from the complaint as is required for the motion to dismiss. I picked up some lines of inquiry that might be required to flesh out the facts based on my own curiosity, but that curiosity is not relevant to the court's action.
The overarching dispute. The Kenteras' brought the action under the APA which permits jurisdiction and waiver of sovereign immunity only if there is no other adequate remedy at law.
Nevertheless, the government asserts that Plaintiffs have adequate remedies outside the instant suit. (Docket #16 at 4). In the government's view, Plaintiffs can pay some or all of the penalties and then file a refund suit under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, or the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). Id. at 4-5. Such a suit would permit Plaintiffs to raise the reasonable cause defense that forms the basis of this action. Id. at 5. Alternatively, if Plaintiffs simply decline to pay the penalties, they could assert the reasonable cause defense during a suit brought by the government to reduce the penalties to judgment pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(2). Id. n3
n3 Plaintiffs believe that this is not a viable option because the government can recoup the penalties without litigation by offsetting payments made by other federal agencies, including Social Security benefits. (Docket #17 at 11); 31 U.S.C. § 3716; 31 C.F.R. § 285.5(a)(1). The government does not address Plaintiffs' position in its reply and therefore seems to have abandoned this argument. Because the Court finds that the Tucker Act and Little Tucker Act afford Plaintiffs an adequate alternative to a claim under the APA, the Court does not decide whether waiting for the government to sue them would also qualify.
Plaintiffs rejoin that the government's proposed alternative avenues are not adequate substitutes for APA review. (Docket #17).The Court held, bottom line, that there were adequate remedies at law under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, here, or the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), here, both of which would permit judicial contest after paying some or all of the FBAR penalties. Basically, those provisions permit suit in the Court of Federal Claims or the district courts for the return of monies illegally collected by the United States (the analysis is a bit more subtle than that, but that is a fair overview). I won't slice and dice the court's analysis; although I could pick at portions of it, I think it gets to the right result -- persons subject to the FBAR penalty do have an adequate remedy and thus do not obtain a waiver of immunity under the APA. The Court concludes:
Considering these principles together, the Court is obliged to conclude that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to show that sovereign immunity has been waived. Macklin, 300 F.3d at 819. Plaintiffs have an adequate alternative to this lawsuit in either the Tucker Act or the Little Tucker Act. Moreover, to the extent Plaintiffs believe that they should not be required to pay any of the FBAR assessments before filing suit, either by preemptively paying them to create jurisdiction under the statutes discussed above, or by waiting for the government to offset their funds from them administratively, this is merely a complaint that APA review might be better for them financially in the short term. It does not, standing alone, demonstrate that paying some or all of the assessments and filing a refund suit in the Court of Federal Claims is inherently inadequate. Cf. Greene v. United States, 124 Fed. Cl. 636, 641 (2015) (noting that illegal exaction claim does not require the taxpayer to first fully pay the tax liability). In any event, Plaintiffs never expressly assert that there is a problem with Tucker Act or Little Tucker Act claims simply because they require a prepayment of the allegedly illegal penalty in order to create jurisdiction. As such, the Court remains unconvinced that the government has waived its sovereign immunity and it must dismiss Plaintiffs' claims.
Plaintiffs have not met their substantial burden to show that the government waived its sovereign immunity with respect to the claims they assert in this action. As a result, the complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The dismissal is without prejudice so that Plaintiffs may avail themselves of whatever other avenues for relief they deem appropriate, including potential claims under the Tucker Act or Little Tucker Act. See Sorrentino v. Godinez, 777 F.3d 410, 414-15 (7th Cir. 2015).