Conflicting Statutes of Limitations for Regular Tax Assessments and Restitution-Based Assessments (4/27/25)

In United States v. Brown (W.D. WA Case No. 24-cv-05021 Dkt. No. 38 Order dated 4/21/25), GS here and CL here, the Court upheld the validity of a restitution-based assessment (“RBA”) against Brown that was for the same tax that had been previously assessed against Brown. (For prior Blogs on RBAs on the Federal Tax Crimes Blog, see here, and on the Federal Tax Procedure Blog, here.) For clarity, I will differentiate the two assessments by calling the first-in-time assessment, the regular assessment and the second-in-time assessment the RBA. The reason that was even an issue was because Brown never fully paid the regular assessment and the 10-year statute of limitations to collect any balance on the regular assessment (by reducing to judgment) had expired. Brown claimed that, since the statute of limitations on the regular assessment had expired, thus preventing the IRS from claiming on that regular assessment, the IRS could not end-run the regular assessment statute of limitations based on the RBA assessment. At least that is how I understand Brown’s claim that the court rejected, thus permitting the government to reduce the RBA to judgment and use the RBA extended statute of limitations to collect (including further extending the statute of limitations).

I think the court properly gives a good textual reading of the applicable statutory provisions. I am concerned that the decision may not be consistent with the purpose or intent of the statute. (For a textualist, purpose or intent may not matter.) Although I have not filtered back through the legislative history, my understanding of the purpose of the RBA was to avoid requiring the IRS to jump through assessment hoops for tax ordered as restitution. In other words, it was to permit the IRS to make an immediate assessment where it had not assessed before. (Stated otherwise, it was not to give the IRS two independent assessments to collect. The Code provisions do not say that, but that is my understanding of the need for an RBA. If the tax later subject to restitution had already been assessed, there would be no need for an RBA. And the IRS could deal with an expiring statute of limitations on the regular assessment by simply reducing the regular assessment to judgment, thereby refreshing the statute of limitations.

It is true that § 6501 says that § 6501(c)(1) says: “In the case of a false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time.” But, at a minimum, that would only apply where there was no regular assessment and presumably no RBA. Where there is a regular assessment, one might argue through inference that the regular assessment statute and its limitation period should apply.

Updates on Developments in IRS Penalty Administration and Voluntary Disclosure (1/11/25)

I post here links to earlier posts on my Federal Tax Procedure Blog about the IRS’s Voluntary Disclosure Practice (“VDP”). ABA Tax Section Comments on VDP Disclosure Form 14457, Voluntary Disclosure Practice Preclearance and Application (1/5/25), here; and IRS Voluntary Disclosure Practice (VDP) Requires Taxpayer Admit Criminal Willfulness (11/29/24; 1/5/25), here.

Also, I have just recently learned that, in the National Taxpayer Advocate’s Annual Report to Congress 2024, here, the NTA discusses two of 10 Most Serious Problems Encountered by Taxpayers that relate to tax administration of the type addressed in this blog (Federal Tax Crimes) and the companion blog (Federal Tax Procedure). Items 9 and 10 are, respectively:

9. Civil Penalty Administration (pdf 16 pages), here; and

10. Criminal Voluntary Disclosure (pdf 17 pages), here.

The most relevant to the initial item in this blog is the Criminal Voluntary Disclosure which I generally refer to as the IRS Voluntary Disclosure Practice (“VDP”). From the discussion of both items, I gather that the practitioner community has major concerns with IRS administration, that the NTA has listened to those concerns (calling the community “external stakeholders”), and that, in large part, the NTA has adopted those concerns.

Although it probably does not matter what I believe, I will state my belief anyway:

Fourth Circuit Affirms Criminal Tax Sentences in Unpublished Opinion that Is Good for Teaching (5/162/24)

In United States v. Rice, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 11329, 2024 WL 2078454 (4^th Cir. 5/9/24), CA4 here and GS here, an unpublished opinion, the Court affirmed the Rices’ convictions and sentencing. Normally, I don’t write on unpublished opinions, but I thought this opinion had some interesting facets which are good teaching opportunities for students or relatively new tax crimes practitioners.

First, the opinion says at the opening (slip op. 3):

James and Susan Rice (collectively, Appellants) appeal their conviction and sentence on ten counts relating to their failure to file tax returns and failure to pay employment taxes to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Finding no error, we affirm.

Second, the Court provides a short summary of the facts, among which was the following (slip op. 4):

Appellants were jointly represented by trial counsel.

In my experience joint representation in a criminal case is very unusual. The concern is that the two defendants might have different interests which would compromise the joint representation. For example, one defendant may have an interest in obtaining the benefits of cooperation (such as no prosecution or a better plea deal) or presenting evidence of a defense which might not be in the other defendant’s interest. I entered such a joint representation with two family members once. After extensive discussion with the defendants, I satisfied myself that there was nothing other than a theoretical possibility of conflict; and they waived the possibility of conflict. Nevertheless, the judge expressed displeasure. Recognizing that it was not in the defendants’ interests to displease the judge, at my advice that it was not worth the hassle, one of the defendants quickly engaged new counsel (a former colleague) and, as often in tax prosecution, both defendants took the same plea deal (without any actual conflict between the defendants).

The joint representation was raised in the ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claim on appeal, to which I now turn.

Third, the opinion rejected an IAC claim on this direct appeal. The Court noted (slip op. p. 4-8):

Supreme Court Holds in Bittner that FBAR Nonwillful Penalties are Per Form Rather Than Per Account (2/28/23; 3/5/23)

In Bittner v. United States, 598 U. S. ____ (2/28/2023), here, the Court held that the best interpretation of the nonwillful FBAR penalty is that it applies per form rather than per unreported account. The nonwillful penalty is in 31 U. S. C. §§5321(a)(5)(A) and (B)(i). Five Justices (Gorsuch, the author of the Court opinion, joined by Justices Jackson, Roberts, Alito, and Kavanaugh, so held. Justice Gorsuch included in the opinion a section on the application of lenity (referred to as II-C), in which only Justice Jackson, joined. The opinion of the Court joined by 4 Justices addresses only the interpretation of the nonwillful penalty provision and not Justice Gorsuch’s lenity discussion.

Four Justices dissented—Justices Barret (writing the dissenting opinion) joined by Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, and Kagan and would have held that the best interpretation of the nonwillful penalty was per account rather than per form.

The holding that the nonwillful penalty is per form rather than per account is a significant holding for all with multiple foreign reporting accounts potentially subject to nonwillful penalties. Beyond deciding that issue—per form vs. per account—the opinions merely interpret the statute. I see nothing of systemic value beyond the resolution of the bare issue of per form or per account that is of ongoing importance.  (It is interesting to note that avowed textualists came down on both sides of the issue.)

This is the type of case where it is important to deal with conflicts among the Circuits and, like the doctrine of stare decisis, "because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right." Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 US 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis dissenting in a tax case). I am mostly agnostic as to the "right" answer to the question of per form or per account. I think I could have credibly argued it both ways. Still, if I were the decider, I think I would have gone with per form rather than per account. My point here, though, is that it is good to have a settled answer.

As a bit of an aside, I note the part of Justice Gorsuch’s opinion—II-C—relating to lenity that attracted only one other Justice and hence is not part of the opinion of the Court. I am reminded of Justice Gorsuch's famous rant in his concurring opinion describing Chevron “elephant in the room” diatribe while on the Tenth Circuit in Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016), here. Then Judge Gorsuch wrote the opinion of the panel but then authored a separate concurring opinion with which the other Judges did not agree.

Good Article on the Abusive Syndication Easement -- Legislative and Judicial Initiatives (6/25/22)

I recommend to readers this article:  Peter Elkind, The Tax Scam That Won’t Die (Propublica 6/17/22), here.  Key excerpts related to tax crimes:

Criminal investigations of industry practices are reportedly underway in three states. The crackdown’s most sensational case became public in February, when a federal grand jury in Atlanta indicted North Carolina developer Jack Fisher, a major syndication deal promoter and owner of Inland Capital Management. The 135-count indictment charged Fisher and six associates with participating in a conspiracy to sell $1.3 billion worth of illegal tax shelters. The charges against Fisher include wire fraud, conspiracy to defraud the U.S., money laundering and aiding in the filing of false tax returns. He has pleaded not guilty.

The indictment was backed by a string of damning statements attributed to Fisher, including several secretly recorded by an undercover government agent posing as an easement promoter.

The indictment, for example, charged that Fisher’s conservation deals relied on “fraudulent” and “grossly inflated” land appraisals, often valuing the easement properties at more than 10 times what he had paid for them just months earlier. It asserted that Fisher routinely “pre-determined” these valuations before any appraisal was actually performed, telling his two “hand-picked” appraisers what valuation he needed to generate the generous deductions he’d promised investors. In one recorded conversation described in the indictment, Fisher said one of the appraisers simply “puts down whatever we say.” In another, he said he always made sure easement valuations were high enough to make sure investors “can still get a good return on their money,” even if a later IRS audit reduced their charitable deduction.

The government also charged that Fisher frequently orchestrated the illegal backdating of checks and tax documents, allowing him to keep offering unsold stakes in his deals to investors as much as nine months after the year-end tax deadline, after the easement was already donated. In one recording, Fisher acknowledged rewarding partners at an accounting firm with free shares in an easement deal because “they participated in basically backdating all the documents.” After learning he was under investigation, according to the indictment, Fisher told one associate he could claim that backdated checks weren’t deposited until after the close of the tax year because they had been “lost” on someone’s desk.

Both appraisers, now among Fisher’s fellow defendants, have pleaded not guilty. One says on his website that his firm decided in mid-2019 to stop doing conservation easement work “until there is greater clarity from the courts on conservation easements.”

Credit Suisse Taking Another Rap on the Knuckles (4/22/22)

David Cay Johnston. Wikipedia here, a prolific author of books and articles on the crimes of the rich, has this article on Credit Suisse, Repeat felon Swiss bank may finally lose privileged American status (RawStory 4/21/22), here.  The article reports that the Department of Labor is acting to take away a favored U.S. status, Qualified Professional Asset Manager, as a result of its numerous crimes.  Johnston reports Credit Suisse’s “rap sheet” as:

Rap Sheet

Credit Suisse has a long and thoroughly documented history of refusing to turn over money due to heirs of Holocaust victims, helping super-rich Americans cheat on their taxes and making loans using unusual terms that turned into disasters for the borrowers. One of its most recent felonies was punished with a $175.5 million fine. That’s chump change for a bank with assets of about $1.6 trillion. The fine was barely 1/10,000th of those assets.

FinCEN Adopts Immediately Effective Final Rule Omitting the Regulations Statement of the 2004 Willful Penalty Prior to the 2004 Statutory Amendment (12/26/21)

Readers may recall that the FBAR willful penalty, as amended in 2004, provides a maximum penalty of the greater of $100,000 or 50% of the amount in the account on the reporting date.  31 U.S.C. §5321(a)(5)(C).  Prior to 2004, the maximum willful penalty was $100,000.  After the 2004 amendment, FinCEN did not amend the regulation, 31 CFR § 1010.820(g), to reflect the change in the statute.  After the amendment, creative lawyers pursued the argument that, by leaving the regulation in tact, FinCEN exercised its discretion under the amended statute to maximize the FBAR willful penalty at $100,000 and thus could not assert a higher penalty under the amended statute.  That argument finally failed.  E.g., Norman v. United States, 942 F.3d 1111, 1117-1118 (Fed. Cir. 2019).

FinCEN has deleted subsection (g), thus eliminating any confusion (real or feigned) about the effect of the statutory amendment.  The Final Rule states that it is immediately effective on the date issued (12/23/21).  See 86 FR 72844, 72844-72845, here.

I have no idea why FinCEN took so long to make that deletion.

JAT Notes:

What is the effect of stating an effective date of 12/23/21?  Why didn’t FinCEN just state that the effective date was the 2004 amendment effective date?  Certainly, the deleted subsection (g) had been effectively deleted by 2004 amendment, as recognized by the court opinions prior to 12/23/21.

While I can't provide a definitive answer as to FinCEN's reasoning, I will step through my analysis.:

NYT Article on Bristol Meyers Aggressive Tax Position With Discussion of Role of Professionals Peddling Audit Risk Insurance through Fees for Faulty Opinions (4/3/21)

 Readers of this blog will likely be interested in this article.  Jesse Drucker, An Accidental Disclosure Exposes a $1 Billion Tax Fight With Bristol Myers (NYT 4/1/21), here.  The article recounts Bristol Myers's use of a highly complex offshore arrangement to avoid (perhaps evade) over $1 billion in U.S. tax.

The thing that I think is particularly interesting for those who have watched bullshit tax shelters over the years is the use of professionals (accounting firm and law firm) to attempt to insulate wealthy taxpayers from penalty consequences of their abusive behavior.  As recounted in the article, Bristol Meyers obtained lengthy opinion letters from PWC, the accounting firm, and from White & Case, the law firm.  The article says that the opinion letters omitted a key discussion that might have cast a pall on the opinion and reliance on the opinion.  The article says:

In addition to detailing the offshore structure, the I.R.S. report revealed the role of PwC and White & Case in reviewing the deal. While both firms assessed the arrangement’s compliance with various provisions of the tax law, neither firm offered an opinion on whether the deal violated the one portion of the tax law — an anti-abuse provision — that the I.R.S. later argued made the transaction invalid.

Tax experts said they doubted the omission was inadvertent. The I.R.S. can impose penalties on companies that knowingly skirt the law. By not addressing the most problematic portion of the law, Bristol Myers’s advisers might have given the company plausible deniability.

Both firms “appear to have carefully framed the issues so that they could write a clean opinion that potentially provided a penalty shield,” Professor Burke said.

David Weisbach, a former Treasury Department official who helped write the regulations governing the tax-code provision that Bristol Myers is accused of violating, agreed. PwC and White & Case “are giving you 138 pages of legalese that doesn’t address the core issue in the transaction,” he said. “But you can show the I.R.S. you got this big fat opinion letter, so it must be fancy and good.”

Over the years, many have observed that such opinion letters serve the sole function of insulating the taxpayer (or, in the case of entities, its officers or managers) from potential penalty liability, including criminal liability.  Those taxpayer knows it is misbehaving but, armed with an opinion from "experts," the taxpayer can say that he reasonably believed he was not misbehaving and thus avoid penalty exposure, at least the serious penalty exposure of criminal liability or the more significant civil penalty liability (civil fraud penalty).  Then with only perhaps imagined exposure only to perhaps a 20% or 40% civil penalty, it may be worth rolling the dice in the hopes that the IRS would never discover the matter.  This is likely a cost/benefit analysis.  What are the costs and potential benefits?  Say for a $1 billion in tax, a  downside (if able to mitigate the more serious penalties) so that only a 20% accuracy related penalty could apply, the downside cost is $1.2 billion with interest (fairly low for a $1 billion "borrowing" from the Government).  The upside is $1 billion in avoided (perhaps evaded) taxes.  And, with powerful and expensive in house and out house professionals helping to lower the risk of audit of the transaction, that may seem to some like a pretty good deal.

Corporate Transparency Act – Beneficial Ownership of Shell Corporations Must Be Disclosed (1/8/21; 2/11/21)

On January 1, 2021, Congress overrode the President’s veto of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (“NDAA”), here.  Among the provisions of the NDAA was TITLE LXIV--ESTABLISHING BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP INFORMATION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS (§§ 6401-6403), which is called and may be cited as “Corporate Transparency Act” (§ 6401).  The CTA adds 31 USC § 5336, titled Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements.

First I will provide a high level summary (with some links), and Second some brief comments.  I will refer to the provisions by the short name by the initialism CTA for the Corporate Transparency Act.

High Level Summary (drawn from the following three web sites as well as a quick review of the CTA’s provisions: Jen Kirby, The US has made its biggest anti-money-laundering changes in years (Vox 1/4/2021), here, Landmark Bill Ending Anonymous U.S. Companies Is Enacted (FactCoalition 1/1/21), here; and Morris Pearl, Congress just passed the most important anti-corruption reform in decades, but hardly anyone knows about it (Fortune 12/26/20), here):

Certain corporations (non traded or with a small level of activity) will have to register their beneficial ownership with Treasury which will incorporate the information into a database that may be accessed by law enforcement agencies.  Prior to this, there was no federal requirement and states usually did not require that beneficial ownership be disclosed.  The CTA does not prohibit otherwise anonymous shell companies; it just requires that the ownership be disclosed to Treasury.  As noted in the Vox article, however, some compromises were made:

Clark Gascoigne

This is, of course, a compromise, right? If I could have waved a magic wand, this is not the bill I would have written.

 But it is a compromise with integrity. Most importantly, the definition of who is a “beneficial owner” in the bill is very strong and will truly identify the ultimate owners of the companies. That’s a big deal.

 Now, it doesn’t solve all of our money-laundering problems. One big exemption in this is that while it applies to corporations, limited liability companies, it does not apply to trusts or partnerships.

 Partnerships are generally considered lower risk, but trusts are a major issue, particularly because the vast majority of trusts in the United States don’t actually register with their legal contracts.

 So you will still be able to set up a trust that could potentially be abused for money laundering after this. That’s something that we’re going to have to take a look at. There are studies that the Government Accountability Office and Treasury Department are going to have to do on the risks posed by trusts. The bill mandates those studies, and hopefully we’ll be able to address that down the road.

 There’s also some concerns around pooled investment vehicles, like hedge funds and private equity funds, that are operated or advised by a registered investment adviser. Law enforcement will be able to tie the fund to the investment adviser, and they’ll know the beneficial ownership information for the investment adviser, but they won’t know it for the fund itself.

 There is a big concern around that because you’ve got trillions of dollars in money going into these private pooled investment funds that could potentially pose some risk for money laundering.

 Jen Kirby

When it comes to those pooled investments, just to make sure I’m understanding this: So if I have dirty money, and I am putting it into this fund with a lot of other investments, it basically muddies the waters. You know who’s managing the fund, but you have no way to pull out each investment, correct?

 Clark Gascoigne

Correct, yeah.

 JAT Comments:

First Criminal Cases from Abusive Syndicated Conservation Easements (12/23/20; 12/29/20)

Abusive conservation easements have been a topic on this blog for some time now.  See here.  DOJ and the IRS have noised about criminal prosecutions, but until this past week none have surfaced.  Now, we have two criminal cases with a pre-wired plea on the filing of the criminal informations.  See DOJ Press Release: Atlanta Tax Professionals Plead Guilty to Promoting Syndicated Conservation Easement Tax Scheme Involving More Than $1.2 Billion in Fraudulent Charitable Deductions (12/21/20), here. 

Relevant excerpts from the press release are:

According to court documents, from at least 2013 through 2019, S. Agee and C. Agee, then partners at an Atlanta accounting firm, marketed, promoted, and sold together with co-conspirators,  investments in fraudulent syndicated conservation easement (SCE) tax shelters. The SCE tax shelters were designed to produce tax deductions for high-income taxpayers through partnerships that purported to make “real estate investments.” In truth, the partnerships were a sham, lacking economic substance and serving no legitimate business purpose. The placement of conservation easements over the real estate was a foregone conclusion, which fraudulently enabled the investors to shelter their income from the IRS with no economic risk and to claim substantial tax deductions to which they were not entitled. S. Agee, C. Agee, and their co-conspirators marketed the SCE tax shelters by promising investors that for every $1 invested in the partnership, the investor would receive more than $4 in charitable tax deductions. 

“The defendants’ and their co-conspirators' criminal conduct enabled their clients to claim more than $1.2 billion in fraudulent tax deductions and generated hundreds of millions of dollars of tax loss to the United States,” said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Richard E. Zuckerman of the Justice Department's Tax Division.

* * * *

Conservation easements were created by Congress to be a key tool used for protecting environmentally and historically important land. The donated conservation easement typically restricts the use or development of land in order to protect its conservation value. When legitimately created and used in compliance with the Internal Revenue Code, the conservation easement can both protect the environment and provide tax incentives. By contrast, abusive SCEs are designed to game the system and generate inflated and unwarranted tax deductions, often by using inflated appraisals of undeveloped land and partnerships devoid of legitimate business purpose.

According to court documents, S. Agee and C. Agee additionally solicited investors after the end of the tax year and advised them to backdate payments and documents to make it appear that the “investments” were timely made before the end of the tax year. S. Agee and C. Agee also prepared and assisted in the preparation of false tax returns for clients who agreed to invest in the SCE shelters. In exchange for their promotion of the abusive SCE tax shelters, between 2013 and 2019, S. Agee and C. Agee each received more than $1.7 million in commissions.

S. Agee and C. Agee both pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States which carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison. They also face a period of supervised release, restitution, and monetary penalties.

The CourtListener dockets for these cases are:  Stein Agee, here, and Corey Agee, here.

Details are set forth in the Stein Agee Criminal Information and Factual Basis available at CourtListener here and here.  I have not attempted to determine if there are material differences in the fact patterns for Stein and Corey Agee, but have instead focused generally on Stein Agee.  As with conspiracy charges generally, the details are summarized in cascading fashion in the Manner and Means and Overt Acts paragraphs of the Criminal Information (pars. 103 and 104, pp. 21-30 (repeated in the Factual Basis, pars. 101 and 102, pp. 22-31)).  Those wanting to know at least the summary details should focus on those paragraphs.

JAT Comments:

Note:  I have substantially revised the Comments portion to present the materials in a way that I think will be helpful to Tax Crimes students, focusing on the potential sentencing considerations indicated by the Agee pleas.

Individual B, the Houston Attorney in the Smith NPA, Is Unmasked (12/1/20; 12/2/20)

I recently posted on the Brockman indictment and the Smith NPA.  One Big Fish Indicted and Lesser Big Fish Achieves NPA for Cooperation (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 10/16/20), here.  In that post I noted:

11.  (Added 9:30pm):  Being from Houston, I was particularly interested in the Houston lawyer who assisted Smith. The Houston lawyer is identified as Individual B in NPA Exhibit A, Statement of Facts.  In summary, Individual B did some very bad acts, creating offshore structures and disguising Smith's participation in those offshore structures.  Brockman (identified as Individual A) referred Smith to Individual B.  I don't know who the Houston lawyer is, but suspect that having practiced in Houston during this period, I likely know Individual B (whoever he or she is).  If anyone knows and is willing to share that information, please let me know.

The Houston attorney, Individual B, is named in a Motion to Dismiss in part for lack of Venue and to Transfer to the Southern District of Texas, here.  The relevant paragraph is (p. 11 of Motion, p. 18 of pdf) (bold-face supplied):

Fourth, and by contrast, the Statement of Facts made by Smith (“Individual Two”) in connection with his Non-Prosecution Agreement describes the extensive role of “Individual B, a lawyer in private practice in Houston, Texas who specializes in foreign trusts and ‘asset protection’ planning,” whom the defense recognizes to be Carlos Kepke. Keneally Decl. Ex. M at Statement of Facts ¶ 5. Mr. Kepke’s practice is located in Houston, Texas, as reflected on his website, his LinkedIn Profile, and the State Bar of Texas lawyer profile. Keneally Decl. Ex. N, Ex. O, Ex. P. The defense is not aware of Mr. Kepke’s role in this investigation, but he is an obvious potential witness.

Kepke's web site is here.  On that web site, he touts his work on Offshore Structures for U.S. Income Tax and Estate Tax Savings.

JAT Comments:

Thoughts on NonProsecution for Trump (11/9/20)

Yesterday, Josh Blackman, law professor at South Texas College of Law, posted this blog:  Would President Biden's Nominee for Attorney General Pledge Not to Prosecute Former-President Trump? (The Volokh Conspiracy 11/8/20), here.  Blackman argues that the Senate, controlled by Republicans, can condition advice and consent to the Attorney General nominee upon the AG nominee agreeing or promising not to prosecute Trump and his associates (whatever associates really means, see below).  I understand that prosecuting Trump for crimes is probably not good for the country, given the passion that almost half the country has for Trump.  I think, however, there is some reason to warrant further investigation as to whether Trump committed serious crimes, including tax crimes, I thought I would state my thoughts on what might be a good resolution of the issue.  I frame my thoughts in terms of tax crimes but it would apply generally for all federal crimes.  And, I frame the discussion in terms of nonprosecution (whether that nonprosecution takes the form of Presidential pardon, full letter immunity, or nonprosecution agreement).

1.  The tax crimes for which nonprosecution is granted to Trump should be identified perhaps without specifying details (such as specific years or tax loss, etc.).  The nonprosecution could be, for example, for all tax or tax related crimes prior to January 2021.  The tax crimes could be listed such as 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (tax evasion) or 18 U.S.C. § 371 (tax conspiracy, offense or defraud).  [As I said above, a similar technique could be applied for other crimes, but I think the crimes for which the country grants nonprosecution should be named.]  I don’t think that Trump should be required to admit specific crimes in the nonprosecution agreement, because he simply won’t do that and investigating the crimes would take too much time and be divisive.  Any crimes Trump commits after January 2021 are not within the scope of nonprosecution.

2.  In return for the country’s gift of nonprosecution, Trump must pledge that he will not attempt to pardon himself or any of his “associates” as Blackman calls them.  [This will require that the agreement be reached before he leaves office.]  I would include in associates that he will not pardon the following: V.P. Pence and all White House officers or appointees (even if serving in a voluntary capacity), cabinet-level appointees, all agency political appointees, all Trump family members, all Trump off-the-Government books minions (like Rudy Giuliani, etc., and Trump players such as Manafort, Stone, etc.), and Trump’s affiliated business entities and their officers, employees or agents.  (This may not be a complete list.)

3. Trump’s civil liabilities to the Government may be pursued.  In the tax area, Trump must agree to cooperate with the IRS and DOJ Tax as necessary to determine tax liabilities, penalties and interest for himself and his affiliated entities.  Trump may still assert any defenses he may otherwise have (e.g., nonliability for the tax or penalties, statutes of limitations, etc.), but Trump must assist and cooperate with the IRS and DOJ Tax in the determination of his liabilities.  On the statute of limitations issue, for years not otherwise within the three or six-year statute of limitations, the IRS would still have to meet the substantial burden of proving fraud by clear and convincing evidence.  (I mention DOJ Tax here only protectively, for the determination of the liabilities is initially an IRS function alone unless it somehow gets to court.)

Corporate Taxpayer (AIG) "Settles" Tax Shelter Litigation Admitting Tax Shelters Were Shams (10/24/20)

The SDNY U.S. Attorney (Acting) issued this stunning press release yesterday:  Acting Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Settlement Of Tax Shelter Lawsuit Against AIG For Entering Into Sham Transactions Designed To Generate Bogus Foreign Tax Credits (USAO 10/23/20), here.   Key excerpts for this blog entry (most of the release) are:

Audrey Strauss, the Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced today the settlement of a tax refund lawsuit brought by insurance and financial services company AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. (“AIG”) involving seven cross-border financial transactions that the United States asserted were abusive tax shelters designed to generate bogus foreign tax credits that AIG improperly attempted to use to reduce its tax liabilities in the United States.  AIG filed this tax refund lawsuit in 2009, seeking to recover disallowed foreign tax credits and other taxes related to the 1997 tax year.  The United States obtained overwhelming evidence that these transactions lacked any meaningful economic substance, were devoid of any legitimate business purpose, and instead were designed solely to manufacture hundreds of millions of dollars in tax benefits to which AIG was not entitled.  According to the terms of the settlement, approved yesterday by United States District Judge Louis L. Stanton, AIG agreed that all foreign tax credits that AIG claimed for the 1997 tax year and all later tax years for these same transactions, totaling more than $400 million, would be disallowed in their entirety.  AIG further agreed to pay a 10% tax penalty.

Acting U.S. Attorney Audrey Strauss said:  “AIG created an elaborate series of sham transactions that were designed to do nothing – and in fact did nothing – other than generate hundreds of millions of dollars in ill-gotten tax benefits for AIG.  Our system of taxation is built upon the premise that all citizens and corporations must pay the taxes they owe, no more and no less.  People and companies who game that system to avoid paying their fair share of taxes undermine public trust in our tax laws.  We will continue to be vigilant in holding accountable those who use economically empty transactions to avoid paying their taxes.”

As alleged in filings in Manhattan federal court:

During the mid-1990s, AIG Financial Products Corp. (“AIG-FP”), a wholly-owned subsidiary of AIG, designed, marketed, and entered into seven cross-border structured finance transactions with various foreign banks.  These complicated transactions, involving hundreds of agreements, numerous shell companies, and intricate cash flows, had no economic substance but rather exploited differences in U.S. and foreign tax laws to create profits from U.S. tax benefits.  In particular, the transactions generated more than $400 million in foreign tax credits that AIG used to reduce its U.S. tax liabilities.  The U.S. has a worldwide tax system that taxes companies on income earned abroad, but also grants credits for foreign taxes paid.  AIG, was able to turn a profit by obtaining credits from the U.S. Treasury for foreign taxes it did not actually pay in full.  AIG obtained more than $61 million in foreign tax credits during the 1997 tax year alone, the tax year resolved by the settlement. 

In 2008, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) issued a Notice of Deficiency to AIG that, among other things, disallowed the foreign tax credits AIG had claimed in connection with the seven transactions and asserted a 20% tax penalty.  In 2009, after paying the deficiency, AIG filed a lawsuit against the United States in Manhattan federal court challenging the IRS’s determination and demanding a refund.  In response, the United States asserted that the IRS had correctly disallowed the tax benefits because the transactions had no economic substance, a basic requirement for seeking tax benefits. 

According to the terms of the Settlement, AIG agreed that all foreign tax credits that AIG claimed in connection with the seven cross-border transactions that were the subject of the litigation would be disallowed in full for the 1997 tax year and all subsequent tax years during which the transactions were operating, totaling more than $400 million.  AIG further agreed to pay a 10% penalty.  The settlement allows AIG to retain certain income expense deductions relating to six of the transactions that were structured as borrowings, as well as remove certain amounts related to the transactions from its taxable income.  In addition, the settlement resolves certain of AIG’s tax refund claims unrelated to the cross-border transactions stemming from AIG‘s restatement of its publicly filed financials.

One nuance not in the press release is that the press release suggests that the penalty is 10%.  The IRS originally proposed a substantial understatement penalty and a negligence penalty.  Both of those penalties are 20% but only one can apply, so that the taxpayer's maximum exposure before the settlement was 20%.  Under the settlement, the taxpayer concedes the substantial understatement or negligence penalties for the bullshit transaction.  (See paragraph 7 of the Stipulation and Order of Settlement.)  That might suggest that the settlement could be read to imply some level of merit in the taxpayer's position, although I suspect that, from the Government's perspective, it was viewed that as simply a nuisance cost to the Government to resolve this bullshit litigation without expenditure of resources required to litigate the matter.

Of course, large corporations who should know better making sham (aka bullshit) tax shelter claims are not particularly unusual as I have noted on this blog.  But this litigation has one nuance that jumped out that I had not really focused on before – that is, the role of counsel bringing suits to sustain tax shelters that are shams.  I guess that problem lurked in all of the other civil litigation involving bullshit tax shelters.  But it just hit me here.  (I never personally had to face that issue because over my career of practice, I declined to represent taxpayers or promoters in civil tax cases involving bullshit tax shelters; although I do have an anecdote about that which I recount at the end of the blog.  See JAT Comments par. 2)

The question I ask is how exactly does an attorney sign the initial pleading and otherwise participate in a suit, either in the Tax Court or in one of the refund forums (district court or Court of Federal Claims), alleging that a sham tax shelter is entitled to the claimed tax benefits?  OK, I know, the argument is that sham is in the eye of the beholder so long as the technical tax traps appear to be checked off (even when sometimes they are not)?  The question I ask and cannot answer here is what is the role of the lawyers making such claims in litigation?  But, just think about how much energy (creative and  otherwise), time and resources were spent unnecessarily in creating the sham tax shelter to start with and then marshaling it through the administrative audit process (audit and appeals) and litigation before the taxpayer admitted the whole deal was a sham.  Isn’t there some better way to deploy our resources?

Private Equity Guru Smith Got a Hell of a Deal (10/23/20)

Today, the Wall Street Journal published what, I understand, is called an “explainer” about the Brockman indictment and the Smith nonprosecution agreement (“NPA”).  See Laura Saunders The IRS Reels in a Whale of an Offshore Tax Cheat—and Goes for Another (WSJ 10/23/20), here.  I previously wrote on these events.  One Big Fish Indicted and Lesser Big Fish Achieves NPA for Cooperation (10/16/20), here.  

The WSJ article provides a good bullet point high-level summary of the events.  I write today to provide some nuance to a sound bite quote that I gave for the article.  The quote, at the end, is:  "Jack Townsend, a lawyer who publishes the Federal Tax Crimes blog, says, 'He got a hell of a deal, considering what he did.'"

My statement was based only on the publicly disclosed facts in the NPA and the Statement of Facts (Exhibit A) with the NPA, which are here and here, respectively.  Those publicly disclosed facts may not tell the whole story as to why Smith achieved an NPA rather than some other disposition (I discuss some possible other dispositions below.)  

Just on those facts, Smith’s deal is exceptionally good for him.  He committed years of tax evasion, then attempted to do a Streamlined disclosure (after being rejected from OVDP) where he had to certify nonwillfulness and submit amended returns and delinquent or amended FBARs which he did and which were false.  That pattern, particularly, the second step Streamlined disclosure was just incredibly stupid.  If he had done only the OVDP and been accepted into OVDP, he likely would have avoided prosecution if his OVDP submissions and cooperation were truthful and complete.  Two caveats on that, however: (i) OVDP did not “guarantee” nonprosecution but, as a practical matter it would if the disclosure and cooperation were good (I am not aware of any prosecution of an OVDP participant whose cooperation was truthful and complete); and (ii) his behavior on the subsequent Streamlined suggest at least that his amended return and delinquent or amended FBAR submissions in the posited counterfactual OVDP if it had gotten that far likely would not have been truthful and thus would not have resulted in the key relief generally offered by OVDP – nonprosecution.

What I address today is why, given the facts in the NPA and Statement of Facts, DOJ would have given Smith an NPA for such egregious behavior (by which I don’t mean just the dollars involved, but more importantly his overall behavior to cheat and avoid getting caught with continued lies).

The Statement of Facts and the NPA do not really address that issue, except that in the press release his cooperation was emphasized.  I presume that the cooperation is not only the cooperation in exposing his own criminal conduct but more importantly in indicting and prosecuting Brockman.  So, this raises some speculations / questions.

1. Did Smith get an NPA because the Government did not have the necessary proof to convict Smith and the NPA was the best the Government could do, particularly if it helped nail a bigger fish?  In other words, the facts in the Statement of Facts could have been provable only after Smith’s cooperation after his lawyers negotiated the commitment for an NPA.  Hence, rather than indicting Smith with a weak case, the Government might have been motivated to grant the NPA in order to get his cooperation against Brockman as well as obtain the monetary benefits accorded by the NPA.  That’s a matter of what each party’s hand was as they negotiated Smith’s disposition.  I just don’t know that.

Extradited E&Y Tax Shelter Enabler Sentenced (6/9/20/ 6/10/20)

I have often posted on the Government’s criminal prosecution of persons promoting abusive tax shelters.  There were a number of prosecutions starting around 2005 as the Government focused on major accounting firms, law firms and financial firms and the persons involved with them.  One set of the prosecutions related to principals at Ernst & Young, the accounting giant.  I blogged on a major Second Circuit decision in the prosecutions and included further links to the blogs on the E&Y prosecutions.  Major CA2 Decision on E&Y Tax Shelter Convictions (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 11/29/12), here; see also E&Y Admits Wrongdoing on Bullshit Tax Shelters; Will Pay $123 Million (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 3/1/13), here.

One of the E&Y defendants in the prosecution, David Smith, reached a plea agreement but left the country before he could be sentenced and serve whatever time would be imposed.  After fighting extradition for years, Smith, an attorney and one of the major facilitators at E&Y, was extradited and sentenced yesterday to three years in prison, the maximum that he could be sentenced under his plea agreement.  The Bloomberg news report is here:  Chris Dolmetsch, Lawyer Who Ran From Ernst & Young Tax Shelter Case Gets 3 Years (Bloomberg News Wire 6/8/20), here. 

According to the article, Smith requested that “he be sentenced to the 11 months he’d already served in New York’s Metropolitan Correctional Center,” after extradition.  Apparently, he also cooperated earlier during the initial investigation phase and reached the plea agreement before he fled the country, so that would be a positive factor for him.  And, in mitigation, Smith claimed that he did not go on the lam to avoid incarceration, but because of the 9/11 events; moreover, he claimed, "he feared prosecutors would renege on promises of leniency after he fully cooperated with their investigation."  The judge imposed the harshest sentence he could under the plea agreement.  I gather that the judge did not buy Smith's claims.  

It is a good thing that his attorneys negotiated a plea with a maximum possible sentence of three years.  The plea was to tax perjury, § 7206(2).  Attached here is a copy of the judgment on CourtListener.  The plea agreement was quite very favorable for Smith given his apparent role in the overall scheme.

Note the last paragraph was revised 6/10/20 12:00pm to reflect that the plea agreement was to § 7206(1), tax perjury, rather than § 7212(a), tax perjury, as I had speculated in the original version.  Either way, the incarceration period is limited to three years.  And, the major point was that the plea was a sweet deal given his apparent role.  Of course his time being held from the date of extradition to the sentencing does not count toward the sentence, but that period is really attributable to the fact that he fled the country rather than punishment for the underlying crime.

District Court Muddles an FBAR Willful Penalty Case (3/21/20; 3/24/20)

I made a key revision on 3/24/20 at 4:00pm as indicated in red below to state with cites to the statute that the willful FBAR willful penalty limits (greater of $100,000 or 50% of unreported accounts) is a maximum penalty, thus giving the IRS authority to assert lesser FBAR penalty amounts than those maximums.  That reading of the willful penalty was implicit in the  rest of the discussion; I just thought it should be made explicit.  The changed language is marked in red below.

In United States v. Schwarzbaum (S.D. Fla. Dkt. 18-cv-81147, Order dated 3/20/20), here, in an FBAR collection suit, the court:

1. Held that Schwarzbaum was not liable for the FBAR willful penalty for 2006 but held open the possibility that the nonwillful penalty might apply. 

2. Held that Schwarzbaum was liable for the FBAR willful penalty for 2007, 2008 and 2009, but held that the IRS’s method of determining the penalty was arbitrary and capricious because it was not based on the June 30 values in the unreported offshore account, but the Court held that the parties were to confer to “in an effort to resolve the outstanding amount owed.”

The CourtListener docket for the case is here.

JAT Comments:

1.  I will not review the facts leading to the holding but will instead only deal with the legal issues in the opinion that I think are worthy of comment.

NYT Article on Perhaps Biggest Tax Heist Ever (1/24/20)

The NYT has this article:  David Segal, It May Be the Biggest Tax Heist Ever. And Europe Wants Justice (NYT 1/23/20), here.  I haven't yet figured out how the scam works, but it is a cum-ex deal.  The article says cryptically:

Through careful timing, and the coordination of a dozen different transactions, cum-ex trades produced two refunds for dividend tax paid on one basket of stocks. 

One basket of stocks. Abracadabra. Two refunds.

Another quote:

Before it all unraveled, the cum-ex ecosystem of lawyers, advisers and auditors enjoyed heady days. Last year, the lawyer who testified anonymously at the Bonn trial described the culture of the cum-ex world to Oliver Schröm and Christian Salewski, two reporters on the German television show “Panorama,” under disguising makeup. It was a realm beyond morality, he said: all male, supremely arrogant, and guided by the conviction that the German state is an enemy and German taxpayers are suckers.

And another quote:

American bankers didn’t try cum-ex at home because they feared domestic regulators. So they moved operations to London and treated the rest of Europe as an anything-goes frontier. Frank Tibo, a former chief tax officer at a bank where Mr. Shields and Mr. Mora worked, said American and British cum-ex traders regarded the Continent as a backwater of old economies ripe for swindling.

The article says that the traders were reluctant to pull the scam in the U.S., so did so in Europe.  One of the larger scammers is reported to tell his cohorts queasy about the scam:

“Whoever has a problem with the fact that because of our work there are fewer kindergartens being built,” Dr. Berger reportedly said, “here’s the door.”

As I read the article, I kept thinking about the Son-of-Boss bullshit tax shelters where lawyers, major law firms, accountants, major accounting firms, brokers, brokerage firms, financial and math gurus and others came together to create and implement raids on the U.S. Treasury.

JAT Comment:

The Interplay of Restitution as Condition of Supervised Release and § 6201(a)(4) Restitution Based Assessment (1/19/20)

For many (perhaps most) federal crimes (certainly those in Title 18), the court "may order, in addition to or, in the case of a misdemeanor, in lieu of any other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution to any victim of such offense, or if the victim is deceased, to the victim’s estate."  18 USC 3663(a)(1)(A).  Restitution is mandatory in some cases, including tax cases with counts of conviction under Title 18 (such as conspiracy).  § 3663A. In tax crimes cases, the IRS is considered a victim for whom restitution may be imposed.  However, this mandatory or even permissive restitution does not apply to the Title 26 tax crimes.  Accordingly, for tax crimes, restitution may be imposed only if (i) "agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement" (18 USC 3663(a)(3)) or as a condition for supervised release or probation (18 USC. §§ 3563(b), 3583(d)).

DOJ CTM 44.00 Restitution in Criminal Tax Cases (Last Edited August 2018), here, has a good bullet-point summary of key restitution points in tax cases (some redundant from the opening paragraph to this blog):

• Restitution is statutory; district courts have no inherent power to order restitution absent statutory authorization.
• Restitution is limited to the actual loss caused by the count(s) of conviction, unless the defendant agrees to pay more.
• For Title 18 tax offenses, restitution as an independent part of the sentence is mandatory pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3663A.
• For Title 26 tax offenses, restitution may be ordered as an independent part of the sentence if the defendant agrees to pay restitution in a plea agreement (18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3)).
• For Title 26 cases in which the defendant has not agreed to pay restitution, restitution may be ordered as a condition of supervised release or probation (18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b), 3583(d)).
• Prosecutors should seek prejudgment Title 26 interest in restitution in order to fully compensate the IRS.
• Use the Tax Division’s form plea language whenever possible (available at § 44.09, infra) 

CTM 44.01 Background provides:

Accordingly, in tax cases, the applicable statutes provide the following: (1) for tax offenses prosecuted under Title 18, restitution is mandatory and is ordered as an independent part of the sentence; and (2) for tax offenses prosecuted under Title 26, restitution is discretionary and is ordered as a condition of supervised release, but the defendant can agree to (and plea agreements should provide for) restitution ordered as an independent part of the sentence.  

Section 209 of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act mandates that when negotiating plea agreements, prosecutors must give consideration “to  requesting that the defendant provide full restitution to all victims of all charges contained in the indictment or information, without regard to the counts to which the defendant actually plead[s].” Pub. L. No. 104-132 § 209; 18 U.S.C. § 3551 note; see also Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance, Art. V(D) (May 2012); Principles of Federal Prosecution, USAM §§ 9-16.320. To assist prosecutors with this statutory and Department requirement, standard language for the restitution portion of plea agreements in tax cases is included in § 44.09, infra. 

Readers of this blog know that § 6201(a)(4)(A), here, requires the IRS to assess the amount of resitutition "for failure to pay any tax imposed under this title in the same manner as if such amount were such tax."

I focus this blog on the interplay of restitution as a condition of supervised release in Title 26 criminal cases and § 6201(a)(4)(A)'s mandate for assessment.  The impetus for this blog is PMTA 2018-19 (8/23/18), here.  I find that, although that PMTA was in my research "pile," I had not focused on it before.  The PMTA concludes bottom-line that

Reuters Reports EU Considers Further Tax Haven Listing (12/9/19)

Reuters has this report:  EU to consider tougher tax haven listing (12/6/19), here.  Key excerpts:

A group of European Union countries is calling for the bloc to cast a wider net when listing tax havens and to consider imposing stricter sanctions for countries facilitating tax avoidance, according to an EU document and an EU official. 

The document, prepared by the Danish government and seen by Reuters, urges a discussion on whether “current criteria provide sufficient protection against tax avoidance and evasion” and pushes for “strengthened” standards and sanctions. Germany and France were among its backers. 

It also calls for a discussion on how member states deal with the issue, asking “Do we internally have sufficient safeguards against tax avoidance and evasion?” 

This potentially sets up a dispute with EU members Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Ireland, which widely use low tax and other sweeteners to host EU headquarters of foreign firms, depriving other EU governments of tax revenues from profits that corporations make on their territory. 

At a meeting of EU finance ministers on Thursday, several EU states backed the Danish proposal, one EU official said, naming Germany, France, Spain and Austria among the explicit supporters. 

* * * * 

Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Ireland were listed in a report by International Monetary Fund researchers in September as world-leading tax havens, together with Hong Kong, the British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, Singapore, the Cayman Islands, Switzerland and Mauritius. None of them are on the [current ] EU list.

JAT Comment:  Good.

RICO Claim Dismissed Against Bullshit Tax Shelter Promoters (11/19/19; 11/22/19)

In Menzies v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP, __ F.3d ___ (7th Cir. 2019), here, the Court dismissed a RICO claim arising out of an alleged fraudulent tax shelter peddled to the taxpayer (Menzies) by a lawyer, law firm and two financial services firms.  The Court held that fraudulent tax shelters can be subject of RICO claims, but Menzies had failed to properly assert the claims in the pleadings.

The particular shelter involved was of the bullshit shelters, often a topic discussed on this blog.  Here is my definition from my Tax Procedure books (Practitioner Edition p. 905 (footnotes omitted); Student Edition p. 616):

Abusive tax shelters are many and varied.  Some are outright fraudulent, usually wrapped in a shroud of paper work and cascade of words designed to mask the shelter as a real deal.  The more sophisticated are often without substance but do have some at least attenuated, if superficial, claim to legality.  Some of the characteristics that I have observed for tax shelters that the Government might perceive as abusive are that (i) the transaction is outside the mainstream activity of the taxpayer, (ii) the transaction is incredibly complex in its structure and steps so that not many (including IRS auditors, if they stumble across the transaction(s)) will have the ability, tenacity, time and resources to trace it out to its illogical conclusion (this feature is often included to increase the taxpayer’s odds of winning the audit lottery); (iii) the transaction costs of the arrangement and risks involved, even where large relative to the deal, offer a favorable cost benefit/ratio only because of the tax benefits to be offered by the audit lottery, (iv) the promoters (and other enablers) of the adventure make a lot more than even an hourly rate even at the high end for professionals (the so-called value added fee, which is often insurance type compensation to mediate potential penalty risks by shifting them to the tax professional or the netherworld between the taxpayer and the tax professional) and (v) the objective indications as to the taxpayer's purpose for entering the transaction are a tax savings motive rather than any type of purposive business or investment motive.   

More succinctly, Michael Graetz, a Yale Law Professor, has described an abusive tax shelter as “[a] deal done by very smart people that, absent tax considerations, would be very stupid.”  Other thoughtful observers vary the theme, e.g. a tax shelter “is a deal done by very smart people who are pretending to be rather stupid themselves for financial gain.”  Others have described the abusive tax shelters as “too good to be true.” 

I could not ascertain precisely what the steps in the fraudulent tax shelter scheme were other than, like Son-of-Boss transactions, the scheme created artificial losses that, presumably, offset the gain on sale of AUI stock, although it is not clear whether that gain was ever reported in order to use artificial losses. (I perhaps just missed something there.)  Here is the best explanation from Judge Hamilton’s dissenting opinion (Slip Op. 33-35):