Readers of this blog will recall that I have written often about
the defraud conspiracy and its interpretation in Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265
U.S. 182, 188 (1924). That
interpretation, which I sometimes call the Hammerschmidt spin, provides
a definition for defraud that expands beyond the definition of fraud in the criminal
law and is thus a judicial expansion. I
and others have expressed concern about that expansion. See e.g., my most recent offering which
summarizes the concern. District Court Rejects Claim That Supreme Court
Expansion of Defraud Conspiracy Is In Error (3/24/22; 3/27/22), here. I
usually address the concern in a tax setting where the Hammerschmidt
spin is referred to as a Klein conspiracy.
Those who have been watching the news may have picked up that
a federal district judge in California recently deployed the Hammerschmidt
spin in determining whether certain communications by John Eastman, Trump’s
putative attorney for attempting to prevent the certification of Biden as President,
including the events surrounding the siege and breach of the Capitol on January 6.
See Eastman v. Thompson
(C.D. Cal. Dkt # 8:22-cv-00099-DOC-DFM 3/8/22), CL here
and GS here [to come]. In rejecting
various claims of privilege or right to withhold documents, the Court concluded inter alia (pp.
36-39) that Eastman and Trump likely committed the defraud conspiracy crime. I
thought readers interested in this issue may like the analysis which I copy and
paste here (I leave the footnote numbers in the text but omit the footnotes except for the footnote citation to Hammerschmidt.):
ii. Conspiracy to Defraud the United States
The Select
Committee also alleges that President Trump, Dr. Eastman, and others conspired
to defraud the United States by disrupting the electoral count, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 371.242 That crime requires that (1) at least two people entered
into an agreement to obstruct a lawful function of the government (2) by
deceitful or dishonest means, and (3) that a [*37] member of the conspiracy
engaged in at least one overt act in furtherance of the agreement.243
As the
Court discussed at length above,244 the evidence demonstrates that President
Trump likely attempted to obstruct the Joint Session of Congress on January 6,
2021. While the Court earlier analyzed those actions as attempts to obstruct an
“official proceeding,” Congress convening to count electoral votes is also a
“lawful function of government” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 371, which
Dr. Eastman does not dispute. An “agreement” between co-conspirators need not
be express and can be inferred from the conspirators’ conduct.245 There is
strong circumstantial evidence to show that there was likely an agreement
between President Trump and Dr. Eastman to enact the plan articulated in Dr.
Eastman’s memo. In the days leading up to January 6, Dr. Eastman and President
Trump had two meetings with high-ranking officials to advance the plan. On
January 4, President Trump and Dr. Eastman hosted a meeting in the Oval Office
to persuade Vice President Pence to carry out the plan. The next day, President
Trump sent Dr. Eastman to continue discussions with the Vice President’s staff,
in which Vice President Pence’s counsel perceived Dr. Eastman as the
President’s representative.246 Leading small meetings in the heart of the White
House implies an agreement between the President and Dr. Eastman and a shared
goal of advancing the electoral count plan. The strength of this agreement was
evident from President Trump’s praise for Dr. Eastman and his plan in his
January 6 speech on the Ellipse: “John is one of the most brilliant lawyers in
the country, and he looked at this and he said, ‘What an absolute disgrace that
this can be happening to our Constitution.’”247 Based on these repeated
meetings and statements, the evidence shows that an agreement to enact the
electoral count plan likely existed between President Trump and Dr. Eastman.
Deceitful
or dishonest means Obstruction of a lawful government function violates § 371
when it is carried out “by [*38] deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by
means that are dishonest.”248 While acting on a “good faith
misunderstanding” of the law is not dishonest, “merely disagreeing with the law
does not constitute a good faith misunderstanding . . . because all persons
have a duty to obey the law whether or not they agree with it.”249
n248 Hammerschmidt v. United States,
265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924).