Most of the opinion, however, addressed the concern about district court's statement that the variance was justified in significant part by the opportunity the defendant might have to pay the restitution ordered by the court. That logic would say that defendants who can pay restitution should be sentenced to longer incarceration than one who cannot pay restitution. So, a defendant who is able to pay restitution by sentencing should be incarcerated but one who is unable to do so should not be sentenced (or not be sentenced as much). And, most practitioners encourage clients to pay restitution before or at sentencing to set the right tone for the judge to give a favorable sentence, but on the sentencing court's reasoning, that advice may be counterproductive. The Court of Appeals spoke to the issue:
If done without qualification, it is troubling to imply that a defendant who owes more restitution, and thus has inflicted more harm or engaged in more culpable conduct, would be more likely to receive a lower prison sentence. See United States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285, 1291 (11th Cir. 2006) ("The more loss a defendant has caused, the greater will be the amount of restitution due, and the greater the incentive for a court that places the need for restitution above all else to shorten the sentence in order to increase the time for the defendant to earn money to pay restitution. Therefore, the more loss a criminal inflicts, the shorter his sentence. That approach cannot be deemed reasonable.").
Even crediting the District Court's concern about the repayment of restitution, it is unclear how the sentence of one day in prison facilitates the repayment of restitution in this case. Stango admitted in his sentencing hearing, through counsel, that "his work life is over" and that "[h]e is going to be living on . . . Social Security and the like for the rest of his life." App. 27. The District Court is required to explain its rationale for its sentence and answer colorable legal arguments on the other side; failure to do so can be procedural error. United States v. Kononchuk, 485 F.3d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 2007). Here, the District Court gave only brief explanations of its application of the § 3553(a) factors and failed to explain its extraordinary downward variance, and thus committed procedural error.Finally, although the Third Circuit had seemed to give the sentencing courts wide Booker discretion (United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc), here), Stango, although nonprecedential, indicates that the exercise of discretion does need reasons.
There is a very thin line between blackmail and a confidential out of court settlement for emotional distress. In the latter case, typically the payment would be made to a lawyer's escrow account thus preserving confidentiality from third parties as to the identity of payer and recipient, and purpose for the payment. This does not appear to have been done.
ReplyDeleteOne question is whether the recipient engaged in any structuring.
Another issue is that both illegal income (if this was blackmail, which we don't know) and settlements for emotional damage are taxable. Did the recipient report the income?
Finally, it is not clear to me whether the structuring was intended to avoid having the government being informed (illegal) or whether he was just trying to avoid the withdrawals leading to gossip among bank tellers (which is not illegal.)
Here is another one of those dirty tricks used by the Service from time to time see IRC section 7430
ReplyDeletewhich governs attorney’s fees in a tax cases. Obtaining attorney’s fees
generally proved difficult, if not impossible, because the statute
requires the taxpayer to show that the position of the IRS lacked
substantial justification. Even in situations in which it loses, the
IRS generally takes positions in cases that meet the standard of
substantial justificationn by conceding the case the IRS avoids having to pay out attorney’s fees even though it causes counsel for the taxpayer to expend great amounts of time and energy to prepare (and try, potentially) the case.
http://www.procedurallytaxing.com/tax-court-continues-to-take-the-same-angle-on-attorneys-fees-when-irs-concedes-the-case/#respond
https://youtu.be/iSNpw5__aXo?list=UU49HGm2XU_KFINcAoLu1OjA
ReplyDeleteHow Goldman Sachs ($GS) distorts sports via tax cheating .
ReplyDeleteAs if the FIFA scandal weren’t enough to be choking on.Quoted in the LA Times, an article about Goldman Sachs’ role in financing large sports stadium:
“Goldman Sachs’ job is to use, if not disguise, every public funding tax shelter and loophole.”
Here is the (sour) juice of this particular story, which mostly concerns the San Diego Chargers:
“Goldman’s plan was to create a public
authority to build and own the stadium, using the proceeds of a
construction loan raised from private investors.
. . .
Using a tax-exempt public authority to sell personal seat licenses and sponsorships allows the teams to avoid many taxes on those sales, saving them tens, perhaps hundreds, of millions of dollars, Vrooman said. The teams would also avoid property taxes on the building, though they would pay rent and other local taxes on the private use of a public facility.
Public agency bonds for the stadium would be tax exempt and sell at lower interest rates.”
There are two pairs of words for this. If you’re more academically inclined, those words are ‘rent seeking;’ you may, alternatively, prefer the more popular term “wealth extraction.”
Build a stadium, fine – but don’t extract wealth from taxpayers in order to do it. Who pays for that?
As our Offshore Game project noted recently, all this stuff is distorting sport:
“How interesting is sport going to be if
the competition is between the accountants and tax advisors, rather than
between the players?
. . .
How will other clubs perceive this?”
The ultimate result is that this club may be able to afford more expensive and better players as a result of this tax cheating, and other clubs will lose matches to these subsidised clubs.
And which are the clubs that are getting these subsidies? The story also mentions the new Yankee stadium in New York; the Oakland Raiders, the San Francisco 49ers, the St. Louis Rams. Big, wealthy, famous clubs. Enabling them to trample on the smaller clubs even more.
Oligopoly, distorted markets and increased inequality – all courtesy of tax cheats (and, in this case, the vampire squid Goldman Sachs.)
Sport will be the poorer for this. As will a lot of taxpayers.
The good news is that this particular extractive deal doesn’t appear to have been signed and sealed yet. But plenty of others have.
The other FIFA scandal: poor countries and the tax-free bubble.
ReplyDeleteAlthough FIFA is technically a non-profit group, it is a monopoly (there is, after all, only one world cup) and this allows it to extract,in economic terms, super-normal profits (or surplus) via its sponsors.
In Africa, what were the terms of this bubble?
“The Act creates a “tax-free bubble” around FIFA-designated sites so that profits on consumable and semi-durable goods sold within these areas will not be subject to income
tax; neither will VAT be applied.”
And what are these sites? Well, they spell out”
-the ten World Cup stadiums
-any FIFA-designated exclusion zone
-any official tournament parking area press and television centres set up for the tournament (including the International Broadcast Centre)
-certain training sites during official FIFA-sanctioned training days at those sites official host city public viewing venues (also known as fan parks)
-certain areas for VIPs
-any other area or facility utilised for official 2010 events as agreed in good faith between FIFA and SARS
Why on earth would South Africa provide such a massive subsidy to such a wealthy global multinationalnon-profit (whose $200 million headquarters sits in a plush Zurich neighbourhood)? Well, the South African legislation continues, almost apologising for the fact that it is being forced to its knees and beg:
“This “tax bubble”, a condition for the hosting of the tournament, is something all World Cup host countries must provide. It means that FIFA, FIFA subsidiaries and the participating national associations (excluding SAFA) will – when it comes to VAT on goods and services directly relating to the tournament – be treated as diplomatic missions are treated.”
Choking on your cornflakes yet? Well, now try the Brazilian version.
Quite rightly, the world is focusing on the latest FIFA corruption scandals. But let’s also never forget this one either. It’s not as current, but perhaps just as rotten.
Note: Craven FIFA Sponsor of the Year Award goes to Adidas, which has guzzled eagerly (like many other FIFA sponsors) from the proceeds of FIFA’s corruption and tax cheating. Check out this pathetic quote:
“Following today’s news, we can therefore only encourage FIFA to continue to establish and follow transparent compliance standards in everything they do.”
USTax, thanks for posting the youtube video. Pretty slick attack on FATCA. Like all such arguments pro and con, there is hyperbole, but still is worth a watch.
ReplyDeleteJack Townsend
I agree with your p.o.v. and have seen 2 cases handled this way. But the more important point here is not how to interpret this ``guidance`` but what is equitable and achievable during appeals which again depends on a cost/benefit analysis.
ReplyDeleteUStax and I are unlikely to agree on this. Jack, would you care to comment?
ReplyDeleteMichael,
ReplyDeleteI am not sure exactly what this "dispute" is about. The way I read the new guidance is as follows: Setting aside the $100,000 floor, the penalty for each year cannot lawfully exceed 50% of the amount in the unreported account on 6/30 of the year following the reporting year. But, since the IRS can impose a lesser penalty, the guidance kicks in to provide in most cases a lesser penalty. That lesser penalty uses as its base the high amount during the reporting year. If, however, the high amount during the reporting year were greater than the amount on 6/30, then the cap required by the statute of 50% of the amount on 6/30 applies.
Example 1: A single year case, reporting year 01. The highest aggregate balance is $200,000. The balance on 6/30/02 is $100,000. The penalty under the guidance would be $100,000, but the statute does not permit the penalty to exceed 50% of the high balance on 6/30, so the penalty is $50,000.
Example 2. Two year case -- years 01 and 02. High balance in year 01 is $200,000. Balance on 6/30/02 is $200,000. High balance in year 2 is $200,000. Balance on 6/30/03 is $100,000. The statutotory maximum penalty for the two years is $100,000 for year 01 and $50,000 for year 02, for an aggregate maximum penalty of $150,000.. Under the guidance, the penalty is 50% of the high balance in the years or, $100,000, allocated 2/3 to year 01 and 1/3 for year 02. Each year's penalty is under the statutory cap for the year.
Example 3. Same, except this smart taxpayer drew down his 6/30 balances in years 01 an 02 to $10,000. Then, the guidance calculation would be the same (producing a maximum guidance penalty calculation of $150,000, but the maximum cap calculation under the statute would be $10,000 (50% of the amounts on 6/30/01 and 6/30/02).
I suppose we could do many variations on these examples, but I think they illustrate my understanding of the guidance.
So, at the end of the day, I think I am agreeing with Michael on this one.
Jack Townsend
Jack, since it makes no sense to just ignore the $100,000 floor - in your example 2 the statutory max. penalty would be $200K for both years.
ReplyDeleteUnfortunately for both of you reality beats theory or guidance in this case. As I mentioned before 2 multi year cases just closed/settled that were handled exactly as I described. In addition 1 with 4 years involved is currently in appeal but it looks as of today as well very likely the 6/30 balance will be used.
USTax, you are right that I should have not ignored the $100,000 minimum, so just add a zero to each of the numbers I used and the $100,000 minimum is irrelevant. So here are the revised examples (with another variation in Example 3 to avoid the minimum $100,000 confusion):
ReplyDeleteExample 1: A single year case, reporting year 01. The highest aggregate balance is $2,000,000. The balance on 6/30/02 is $1,000,000. The penalty under the guidance would be $1,000,000, but the statute does not permit the penalty to exceed 50% of the high balance on 6/30, so the penalty is $500,000.
Example 2. Two year case -- years 01 and 02. High balance in year 01 is $2,000,000. Balance on 6/30/02 is $2,000,000. High balance in year 2 is $2,000,000. Balance on 6/30/03 is $1,000,000. The statutotory maximum penalty for the two years is $1,000,000 for year 01 and $500,000 for year 02, for an aggregate maximum penalty of $1,500,000.. Under the guidance, the penalty is 50% of the high balance in the years or, $1,000,000, allocated 2/3 to year 01 and 1/3 for year 02. Each year's penalty is under the statutory cap for the year.
Example 3. Same, except this smart taxpayer drew down his 6/30 balances in years 01 an 02 to $300,000. Then, the guidance calculation would be the same (producing a maximum guidance penalty calculation of $1,500,000, but the maximum cap calculation under the statute would be $300,000 (50% of the amounts on 6/30/01 and 6/30/02).
Now, I have limited experience on how cases were finally closed prior to the issuance of the guidance. I do know that the proposal in my case was not consistent with the guidance and applied 50% of the account balance as of 6/30, just as the statute says it should be applied (although the statute says only up to 50% on that date). So, in order to mitigate consistent with the guidance and consistent with the statute, the IRS could figure out which percentages less than 50% are required on each 6/30 to achieve the guidance result.
My caveat, of course, is that I did not make the guidance and am not responsible for administering it. Still, as I read the guidance, I think it operates in the fashion I mentioned -- by making the calculations based on the high balance during the year, if a lower number is achoived that 50% for the relevant 6/30 years, the lower guidance numbers will apply.
Still, of course, I don't doubt that when a date is tagged for the penalty, it will be the 6/30 date mitigated in amount by the calculations under the guidance based on the high balances during the years. At least that is the way I read the guidance. However, I have no dog in the hunt and nobody yet has paid me to assist in a real world decision on this issue. When someone does, you may be sure that I will come back to and drill down harder to the various viewpoints presented in this comment trail.
Thanks for all your comments.
Jack Townsend
No Jack your Example 3 is not correct. The maximum guidance penalty calculation would be $1,000,000 and not 1,500,000 as you write.
ReplyDeleteAgain why would or should this be a ``smart`` TP in Example 3 !?
Ok, USTax, my calculations may be off and the dates wrong (you understood that I meant 02 and not 01). The point of this whole discussion is how does the IRS intend to apply its guidance. I think my examples, with all its inconsequential errors, illustrates the differences in your and my (and Mr. Miller's) understandings of the guidance. That is little to be gained from further discussion. We must await the IRS's application of the guidance. Thanks for the scintillating discussion, thought.
ReplyDeleteJack Townsend
As a final correction and guidance to readers with regards to ``We must await the IRS's application of the guidance``..... The guidance is out and in operation and currently 1 case involving 3 years in appeals will be handled in the way I described here : not with max. aggregated balance but the date of the offense which is 6/30.
ReplyDeleteUStax thanks for your valuable insights but I have to laugh when a tax lawyer describes the difference between $1,500,000 and $1,000,000 as an `` inconsequential error`` . I had a similar experience with mine where he mixed up as well dates, SOL years and balances. This was anything but funny and certainly not cheap.
ReplyDeleteAre you saying that, in your case, the IRS is doing 3 years of 50% of the balance on 6/30? And, are you saying that the calculations under the guidance would produce a lesser result? So, the IRS is going beyond the guidance. Is that what you are saying. If so, your client's facts must be bad and the guidance does permit a higher result, not in excess of the 50% caps for the years involved.
ReplyDeleteJack Townsend
Atticus,
ReplyDeleteThat difference between $1,500,000 and $1,000,000 was inconsequential to the point that starting this whole lengthy discussion. That amount is not inconsequential to me or to my clients, but if you followed the discussion USTax and I were having, it was inconsequential to the points we were discussion. That does not excuse my error, of course, but to make the point again it has nothing to do with our point of difference.
If it makes you feel better to jump on another lawyer, then I suppose that that is as good a use as any for these comments.
Jack Townsend
The only thing that matters is that the clients will achieve a much better result . With 50% of the aggregated high balance it would have been over $200K but 3 x 50% of 6/30 balance will be under $70K . The statutory max. will not be applied and never even was on the table.
ReplyDeleteSo, what happens in the case when the account is only open during one calendar year or if the SOL has run out on previous years and only one year is under consideration? Suppose that the balance for the year was $500,000. The account balance on 6/30 was zero because the account was closed. Since the statutory maximum is 50% of the value of the account on the date of violation then the penalty would be zero.
ReplyDeleteThanks, USTax.
ReplyDeleteI am confused, though. You said the settlement is 3 x 50% of the 6/30 balance. Isn't that the maximum statutory penalty and the guidance specifically allows for that. In other words, the guidance calculation will apply only when it produces a result less than the maximum 50% on each 6/30 of the following year in issue.
Jack Townsend
Andre, thanks for your comment. I am not sure whether you were asking a question, but if you were I think your analysis is correct. There would be no penalty.
ReplyDeleteJack Townsend
Thanks Jack,
ReplyDeleteMy question was not exactly clear. For year 1 you had a maximum aggregate balance of $500k. You closed the account at the end of year 1. The balance on 6/30 of year two was zero because the account is closed so the statutory maximum is zero(50% of zero is zero.) So basically you get a pass and there is no FBar penalty.
That seems curious because then everybody would get a pass on the last year they had their account open.
Yes this is correct the guidance calculation will apply only when it produces a result LESS than the maximum 50% statutory penalty (specifically excluding the $100K floor) on each 6/30 of the following year in issue. I hope you can appreciated finally the importance of this issue for certain groups of TPs
ReplyDeleteIt depends. Even after this new guidance the old floor of $100k or 50% as of 6/30 (the greater of) still hypothetically exists and I am sure if bad facts are present in a case were the max. balance was $500K will be used.
ReplyDeleteIt is curious, but that is the way I read the statute and the way, I think, most read it.
ReplyDeleteJack Townsend
Of course, the max penalty under the statute is the greater of $100,000 and 50% of the balance on the date of the violation (6/30), so there could still be a $100,000 penalty under the statute. I also do not believe the cap under the recent guidance would be any lower. As indicated below, I believe the cap under the recent guidance is based on the high value during the year (not the date of the violation). Finally, I think the guidance applies to violations over multiple years, and may not apply where only a single year is involved.
ReplyDeleteyes UStax I agree with you - this makes more sense now. To be willful on a $500,000 balance and get away with $100,000 seems still a decent deal (20%) . Thank you for your guidance and correction.
ReplyDeleteNo Jack the $100,000 UStax mentioned would be the correct interpretation of the statue in this example.
ReplyDeleteJack, at what point would you stop signing extensions for tax assessment ,form 872?
ReplyDeleteI have been in the program for over 3.5 years and have signed 3 extensions, but just recently another agent asked for extensions to Dec 31 2017. My lawyer says just sign them, but I think she is acting in her own interest because that keeps me on retainer for another 2 years while the IRS takes their sweet time doing nothing to resolve my case. Also how long can a protective order for a refund say in place. Is it indefinite until one's case is resolved.?
Thanks
As to whether you should sign extensions, the issue os the stage of the process. I presume that you have submitted the final package (amended or delinquent returns, delinquent FBARs, etc.) but have not yet been presented a Form 906. If that is the case, then, although there is not general legal requirement to sign consents (Forms 872), you are required to cooperate in the process and I have generally thought that giving consents at that stage of the process of appropriate. The purpose of the consents is to protect the Government in the case you opt out. So long as you accept the offshore penalty in OVDP/I (either the regular offshore penalty or the streamlined transition penalty), the statute of limitations is irrelevant and you will sign the resulting Form 906 and pay accordingly. The consents really protect the Government if you opt out. So, you are not hurt at all by signing consents unless you plan to opt out. Then you could be hurt, but I suspect that, if you refuse to sign, the IRS may kick you out and an audit will pursue. Keep in mind that you have already done the audit work for them and, on the audit (either by opt out or kick out), the focus will be principally the FBAR penalty. That could be problematic and, by refusing consents, you may not have a pre-assessment Appeals right.
ReplyDeleteAll in all, unless there are unusual circumstances before you have opted out or been kicked out, I think the consents probably should be given.
If you are in the audit stage (either by opt out or kick out), then you have to make the same strategic decision as any audit as to whether to give a consent. Again, thought the consequence is that you may forego an Appeal and have to get it after the penalty is assessed.
Finally, keep in mind that in the audit (whether by opt out or kick out), there may be years that, although nominally covered by the income tax consents are not effective because the income tax year was already closed when the first consent was signed.
As to the protective claim for refund, the statute of limitations on getting and claiming the refund is open until two years after the IRS formally notifies you of the claim denial. The statute should stay open until the case is resolved because the IRS will not deny the claim. However, if you do get notice of denial of the protective claim, consult promptly with your lawyer.
Jack Townsend
Jack many thanks for your wise comments and insight.
ReplyDeleteBlackseal, If I remember correctly a few readers here told you already as early as 12/2013 to switch lawyers because the things you described regarding your facts and circumstances and how she represented your case were a poster case of how not to do get stuck in the TBT or TaxBermudaTriangle .Some blogs even used your case as an analogy of ``how not to do it``. But I get the impression that you like paying $200,000 for counseling and/or are very unsure about your level of culpability.
ReplyDeleteTo notamused .I don't expect Jack to remember every bloggers details. Yes I did opt out 6 months ago. I have switched lawyers again. .
ReplyDeleteWhat is your specific advice about the extensions once opted out?
A third option is to sign a consent for less than the 2.5 years requested, for example through 12/31/2016 (1.5 years for now, and tell them if another consent is requested a year from now, you will consider it. Also, although the consents have to extend to 12/31 when entering OVDI, I don't see why uou could not allow an extension through another calendar day (for example 6/30/16, a year from now.)
ReplyDeleteAs to stretching out legal fees, your lawyer should not be doing anything or billing you if there is no communication from the IRS. And I do hope you have a different lawyer than the original one. If you would like to know my experience (I recommend mine, with some reservations) maybe we can do so through email.
This might sound like a dumb question, but can the IRS ask to extend the SOL on a year that has already passed. For example, assume for FBAR reporting purposes 2008 is still open until 06/30 2015. Could the IRS ask for an extension AFTER 06/30 has passed. I'm assuming they would have to request this extension PRIOR to the SOL expiring correct?
ReplyDelete1. It is important to differentiate between income tax extensions and FBAR extensions.
ReplyDelete2. An income tax extension filed after the SOL has expired is not effective because of the wording of Section 6501(c)(4)(A). See the statute here. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/6501
3. In the OVDP, the IRS does ask for income tax extensions covering otherwise barred years. The IRS does not need any extensions or any open statutes of limitations for the OVDP settlement which is just a settlement and an agreement to pay the 8 years of income tax, penalties and interest regardless of whether the years are barred. The IRS does need the extensions to protect against a taxpayer opting out. For this reason, the IRS asks for extensions covering all 8 years and, if the taxpayer opts out, will sort out which years they are effective for (only the years that were otherwise open when the original consents were signed).
4. FBAR consents are different. There is no statutory provision for such consents and hence the IRS does not have the limitation for income tax consents discussed in paragraph 2 above. The IRS position is that the FBAR consents are waivers under standard common law statute of limitations law. Under that law, the IRS maintains, the waivers are effective regardless of whether the statute of limitations was open when the waiver was signed.
5. As with the income tax consents, the IRS does not need the FBAR waivers inside the OVDP because the penalty inside the OVDP is an offshore, miscellaneous IRS penalty, not an FBAR penalty. And, of course, it is a settlement, so whether the statute is open is irrelevant.
6. The IRS needs the FBAR consents only to hold open the statute of limitations if the taxpayer opts out. The IRS position is that all years covered by an effective consent is open during the period covered by the consent.
Jack Townsend
No they cannot ask for an extension after the SOL date has passed. I know this for a fact because they have never asked for an extension once a SOL has passed.
ReplyDeleteBlackseal1234,
ReplyDeleteThat no should be qualified. In fact, they ask for extensions for the years in OVDP even though some of those years are closed and the extensions will be null and void on opt out.
In a regular audit, it is true that the IRS should not ask for extensions if they think the statute has closed. But, for example, they may think that the six year statute applies but hasn't completely nailed that down and thus ask for an extension which will then be invalid if the six-year statute is found ultimately not to apply.
But, to circle back, if for any reason a consent to extend is signed at a time that the statute has already closed for one or more years in the consent, the consent is invalid as to the closed years.
Jack Townsend
You asked specifically with regards to FBAR SOLs outside of OVDI/P during regular audits and yes you are correct. Once 6/30 2015 has passed - tax year 2008 is closed
ReplyDeleteThat is true, but if at any time the taxpayer enters a consent and the IRS signs it, the SOL is extended (including revived and extended if it had otherwise expired).
ReplyDeleteJack Townsend
Sorry, now I am confused. So, during a regular audit, the IRS arrives and knows full well that the FBAR SOL has expired. 1) can they ask for a consent to extend? 2) if they ask for the consent, should the taxpayer sign it? 3) if the taxpayer signs the consent, is the SOL extended even if the SOL had indeed expired when the IRS requested it?
ReplyDeleteFor readers the important fact is if for any reason a consent to extend is signed at a time that the statute has already closed for one or more years in the consent, the consent is invalid as to the closed years.
ReplyDeleteI am sorry also, I thought the discussion was principally about income tax and SOL. As to FBAR and FBAR SOL, I have not had experience in regular audits. With that caveat, I do not think the IRS in a regular FBAR audit will ask for an extension of an otherwise barred year for FBAR assessments. But, if the IRS were to ask that in an FBAR audit, the taxpayer can simply refuse. Keep in mind that the FBAR SOL is six years and the IRS has plenty of room in that six year period to find penalty dollars.
ReplyDeleteJack Townsend
In the words of this BNA article “New constraints on penalties the IRS will impose when taxpayers don’t properly report their foreign bank accounts show agency concerns that some will argue in court that huge penalties are unconstitutional, attorneys told Bloomberg BNA.
ReplyDeleteIRS guidance limiting the penalties examiners can assert for failure to file the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts “reflects some awareness and sensitivity about the constitutional issue presented by a multi-year FBAR penalty,” ……..
“The notion that the government will exercise some administrative restraint is a good development.”
Let the litigations begin.
http://www.bna.com/new-fbar-limits-n17179927429/?elq=4e5f8e82daa945c3a42c287a14e85623&elqCampaignId=882&elqaid=1571&elqat=1&elqTrackId=ef57973ec09040b1be7c66555ff36435
or shortlink
http://bit.ly/1MOU4kv
Latest #FIFA news, Swiss bank, Julius Baer now holding their own investigation, where will the breadcrumb trail end...........
ReplyDeleteSwiss authorities are investigating 53 FIFA-related banking activities http://bloom.bg/1emReIg
ReplyDeleteTurkey levies a 15 percent tax on footballers playing in the Spor Toto Super League and collects the second-lowest tax from footballers among European countries
ReplyDeleteAccording to the Income Tax Law currently in force, footballers playing in the Super League pay a 15 percent tax while those playing in lower league clubs pay 10 percent and those playing in other clubs pay 5percent. The tax rate imposed on football managers is 35 percent.
Even though tax rates imposed on footballers are planned to increase with the new Income Tax Law, Turkey levies the second-lowest tax on footballers in Europe along with Lithuania after Bulgaria, which levies a 10 percent tax.
The huge difference between taxes imposed on the income of athletes in Turkey, developed countries and Western countries continues to draw attention. Sweden is the country that imposes the highest tax on footballers in Europe at 56.9 percent, followed Portugal, Denmark and Belgium with 56.5 percent, 55.6 percent and 53.7 percent, respectively.
Whereas professional footballers pay 45 percent of their income as tax in the U.K., where the heart of European football beats, footballers pay a 47.5 percent tax in Germany, 47.9 percent in Italy and 50.3 percent in France.
The practice of imposing a 15 percent tax rate on footballers without taking into account their millions of dollars of income will end with the new Income Tax Law. Instead, a progressive tax system will be applied and they will pay taxes in accordance with their taxable income.
According to current regulations, a 15 percent cut on the payments given to footballers is thought to be enough. However, if the proposed Income Tax Law is passed and implemented without any change, cuts made on payments will increase. Additionally, if income exceeds a certain amount, it will be necessary to file an income tax return and pay additional taxes.