I have written before about federal law enforcement -- specifically IRS -- use of cell site simulators, often called Stingrays (the trademark of one brand of simluator). IRS Use of Cell-Site Simulators (Also called Stingray) to Retrieve Information About and From Cell Phones (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 12/3/15), here. The Seventh Circuit has just issued a decision involving the use of cell site simulators. The technology was not used in a criminal tax investigation, but it could be so used. Of course, in a federal criminal investigation, as noted in the prior blog entry, the DOJ Guidelines for use will be honored and the IRS has agreed to respect those guidelines. But, since court opinions about use of the technology are rare (at least to date), I thought readers might want to know about a recent case with thoughtful majority and dissenting opinions on the use of the technology.
In United States v. Patrick, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21090 (7th Cir. 2016), here, local police located a person for whom an arrest warrant had been issued by using stingray technology. Police had first obtained a warrant to use the technology. It did not specifically advise the court issuing the warrant for the electronic location as to precisely how it would locate the target. Federal charges were then brought based on the fruits of the arrest. The use of the stingray technology to locate the person was discovered only in post appeal briefing. So, the issue presented to the Seventh Circuit was whether the use was inappropriate -- either at all or without a warrant or without a warrant issued for its specific use -- and if not in any respect, could this person obtain relief.
Judge Easterbrook wrote the majority opinion, joined by Judge Kanne. Judge Wood wrote the dissenting opinion. I have had occasion over the years to focus on the opinions of Judges Easterbrook and Wood. Both are great judges. I am less familiar with Judge Kanne, but he did not author the opinions.
I think the briefs might be helpful, but have been unable to log onto Pacer to obtain them. I did find the link to the Amicus brief, here.:
I recommend that readers interested in this issue read both opinions. I won't try to summarize them here, but I will excerpt portions discussing the potential uses of the technology.
Judge Easterbrook quotes the DOJ Guidance which I quote and link in my original blog entry.
Judge Easterbrook then says:
If the Department's description is accurate (a question not explored in this litigation) law-enforcement officials get the same sort of information that a phone company could provide using its own facilities, and they get it in real time rather than waiting for the phone company to turn over data. But instead of collecting information on just one person, as the warrant in this proceeding entitled the police to learn Patrick's location, a cell-site simulator collects the relative location of everyone whose phone is induced to connect to the simulator—though it may discard that information before alerting officials to the presence of the sought-after person (just as the phone company, which has location data about all of its customers, would disclose only one person's location).
One potential question posed by use of a cell-site simulator would be whether it is a "search" at all, or instead is covered by Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1979), and United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 103 S. Ct. 1081, 75 L. Ed. 2d 55 (1983). The former holds that a pen register is not a search because it reveals the making of a call, and the number called, but not the call's communicative content. The latter holds that the use of a beeper is not a search, because it reveals a suspect's location but nothing else. Recent decisions such as United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc), and United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), apply these principles to hold that tracking a person via data from phone companies is not a search within the scope of the Fourth Amendment. (Graham involved historical cell-tower location information and Carpenter involved "transactional records" from phone companies, so both cases dealt with the sort of information covered by the location warrant in this proceeding.) Police freely use databases, containing information such as the addresses associated with automobile license plates and persons licensed to drive, to track down suspects; they search trash for credit card receipts showing where he made purchases; they consult a suspect's relatives and friends (and sometimes his enemies) to learn his whereabouts; no one thinks that those methods require a search warrant.
A contrary line of argument analogizes cell-site simulators to GPS locators, which are treated as searches when police enter private property to install them, see United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 132 S. Ct. 945, 181 L. Ed. 2d 911 (2012), and may be searches when used for extended durations even if installed with a vehicle owner's consent, id. at 954-64 (concurring opinions of Sotomayor and Alito, JJ.). If a cell-site simulator is like a GPS tracker, and if the approach of the concurring opinions in Jones is adopted, then it would be necessary to know how long the police used a simulator while searching for Patrick and just how accurate is the location information it provides. (Is it information that leaves uncertainty about where in several city blocks a suspect may be, such as the beeper in Knotts, or is it closer to the precise location supplied by a GPS tracker?) Cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001) (thermal image of the inside of a house is a search, given a person's strong privacy interest in his dwelling).
The United States has conceded for the purpose of this litigation that use of a cell-site simulator is a search, so we need not tackle these questions. The parties join issue, however, on the significance of the fact that police did not reveal to the state judge who issued the location-tracking warrant that they planned to use a cell-site simulator—indeed, implied that they planned to track him down using his phone company's data. Patrick says that leaving the judge in the dark (perhaps misleading the judge by omitting a potentially material fact) makes the location-tracking warrant invalid. This poses the question whether a judge is entitled to know how a warrant will be executed.