Showing posts with label Sentencing - Grouping. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sentencing - Grouping. Show all posts

Thursday, January 7, 2016

To Group or Not to Group Under the Guidelines (1/7/16)

United States v. Doxie, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5 (11th Cir. 2016), here, that deals with the Sentencing Guidelines' concept of grouping.  First, the facts relevant to this discussion.

The defendant defrauded his employer by submitting fictitious invoices for which the employer periodically mailed checks to company of $642,196.  In addition, the defendant charged the employer for false work-related expenses aggregating $287,466.33.  He did not report the income on his tax returns for 2008-2011, underpaying taxes in those years by $299,750.  For this misconduct, he "pled guilty to 21 counts of mail fraud for the false invoices (Counts 1 to 21), 41 counts of wire fraud for the false credit card charges (Counts 22 to 62), and 4 counts of filing a false tax return for the four tax years (Counts 63 to 66)."  Each of the mail and wire fraud counts carries a 20 year maximum sentence.  So, the maximum incarceration time for the fraud charges by stacking the counts would be 3,720 months.  18 USC § 1341, here, and § 1343, here.  The tax charges are tax perjury with a 3 year maximum incarceration (§ 7206(1), here), so the 4 counts would add another 144 months maximum.  The aggregate maximum sentence would thus be 3,864 months, well over 322 years.

Readers know that, where the counts of conviction are only for tax crimes, the major factor in the sentencing is the tax loss.  See S.G.  § 2T1.1(a)(1), here, and the tax loss table, here.  The nuance is that multiple counts of conviction for tax and tax related crimes (e.g., the defraud / Klein conspiracy under 18 USC 371, here), the tax loss is aggregated (including tax loss for relevant conduct outside the counts of conviction) and the calculation made accordingly.  Accordingly, for the initial Base Offense Level calculations in § 2T1.1(a)(1), it makes no difference whether there are multiple counts of conviction.  The counts of conviction are principally relevant in determining the maximum period that can be imposed if the guidelines calculation exceeds that maximum.

Chapter Three of the Guidelines contains adjustments that must be considered.  Part D deals with multiple counts of conviction.  As noted above, multiple counts are not considered in a pure tax case in calculating the Base Offense Level.  Where the counts of conviction are solely tax and tax-related, multiple counts of conviction do not require any adjustment to the calculations.  However, where there are multiple counts of conviction included unrelated offenses, there may be an adjustment.

To follow the Guidelines, the Court "groups" the counts of conviction into "distinct Groups of Closely Related Counts," determines the Guidelines calculations for each group and then makes adjustment if there is more than one Group.  In the example I just posited for only tax and tax-related crimes, there is only one Group, hence there is no further adjustment under Part D.  But, in cases illustrated by Doxie, there may be more than one Group -- (i) the nontax financial crime with sentencing calculations under S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(1) and § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I), here, and (ii) the tax crime with calculations under § 2T1.1(a)(1).  In such cases, if the Guidelines for only one of the Groups were considered, there would be no consideration of the convictions in the other Group.  The purposes of Part D are two-fold:  First, by grouping related counts of conviction, prevent the prosecutor from affecting the sentence by inflating the number of charges for a common pattern of conduct.  Second, to provide some level for incremental punishment by increases in the offense level that then increases the guidelines ranges under the sentencing table.

Now, let's turn to Doxie.  The key question in Doxie was whether there really were two groups to permit some level of incremental consideration under the grouping rules:  I cut and paste the key parts of the Court's resolution of the issue:.

Tuesday, September 4, 2012

Relevant Conduct and Groupability (9/4/12)

Circuit Splits blog has a discussion of a circuit split regarding the application of the Sentencing Guidelines relevant conduct concept.  Fourth Circuit Joins Lopsided Split in Authority Over Grouping Guidelines (Circuit Splits Blog 9/4/12), here.  The blog discusses United States v. Horton, ___ F.3d ___, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 18423 (4th Cir. 2012), here and here.  Horton is a nontax case, so I won't dwell on the details of the facts giving rise to the issue, but will state the issue and its potential relevant to tax crimes case.

The issue has to do with the concept of relevant conduct and, specifically, how criminal conduct other the counts of conviction can be factored into the Guidelines sentence.

In criminal tax cases, the principal driver for sentencing is the tax loss which determines the Base Offense Level under the Tax Table.  See Sentencing Guidelines §2T1.1, here, and §2T4.1, here.  The higher the tax loss, the higher the indicated Guidelines sentencing range (subject to adjustments before the Sentencing Table is applied).  Relevant conduct requires that the tax loss for noncharged conduct be included if relevant, as defined in the Guidelines, and the Government proves the conduct and tax loss at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence (some courts might say by clear and convincing evidence).  If, as is usually the case the defendant pleads guilty, the relevant conduct will usually be stipulated in the plea agreement.

Wednesday, May 16, 2012

Good Case on Grouping for Tax Crimes for Sentencing Purposes (5/16/12)

In United States v. Register, 678 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2012), here, the Eleventh Circuit held that grouping under SG § 3D1.2(d), here, is required for counts of conviction for failure to pay over,  §  7202 (13 counts), and tax perjury,  §  7212 (4 counts).  Generally, for a defendant, grouping is good and not grouping is bad.  Bottom line, the Court on the facts found sufficient nexus between the two crimes to group.  The opinion is very good and I highly recommend it to readers.

Because the opinion is so good and reasonably succinct, I don't try to summarize.  Rather, I refer readers interested in the grouping concept to read the opinion.  For persons not that familiar with the concept, I offer the following from my Federal Tax Crimes book (as revised for the Register case, but omitting the footnotes).

To Group or Not to Group - That is a Question.

I noted repeatedly in the crimes section that a pattern of criminal activity that is essentially a unified crime may violate more than one criminal statute and thus could give rise to several or even many criminal counts in an indictment drafted at the discretion / whim of the prosecutor.  For example, a pattern of conduct might constitute tax evasion and tax perjury – i.e., the taxpayer files a false return underreporting his or her tax liability.  Should the prosecutor be able to squeeze out a greater sentence by charging tax evasion and tax perjury for the same pattern of activity?