1. On the threshold issue of the district court's jurisdiction, the Court questioned whether the district court had jurisdiction under the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). That concern was mooted because the court concluded that it was a tax claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1). Tax claims are, at least facially, subject to the Flora full payment rule. Bedrosian did not make full payment hoping that the Little Tucker Act avoided that requirement. So, since this was a tax refund action, according to the Court's concern, Flora required full payment. But, according to the Court, the district court did have jurisdiction over the Government's counterclaim. So, the district court had some jurisdiction and, as a result, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal.
2. On the merits, the Court held that, for the FBAR penalty, the Government must satisfy the civil willfulness standard, which includes both knowing and reckless conduct. The Court thus was consistent with the consensus of the previously decided cases. The Court said that willfulness, as interpreted, required both a subjective and objective inquiry.
3. The Court remanded because the Court was not certain that the district court's finding of nonwillfulness considered the objective aspect of willfulness.
I have previously posted on the lower court Bedrosian trajectory (reverse chronological order):
- Big Win for Taxpayer/Filer in FBAR Willful Penalty Case (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 9/21/17; 9/23/17), here.
- Order on Motion In Limine and Trial Briefs in Case Involving FBAR Willful Penalty (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 9/11/17), here.
- Court Denies Cross Motions for Summary Judgment on FBAR Willful Penalty (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 4/13/17), here.
JAT Comments (added 12/22/18):