Tuesday, December 15, 2015

Three More Banks Obtain NPAs under DOJ Swiss Bank Program (12/15/15)

On December 15, 2015, DOJ announced here that Crédit Agricole (Suisse) SA (CAS), Dreyfus Sons & Co Ltd, Banquiers (Dreyfus), and Baumann & Cie, Banquiers (Baumann) have entered NPAs under the DOJ program for Swiss banks, here.  The penalties are:

Crédit Agricole (Suisse) SA (CAS)
$99.211 million
Dreyfus Sons & Co Ltd, Banquiers (Dreyfus)
$24.161 million
Baumann & Cie, Banquiers (Baumann)
$7.7 million

Key excerpts are:
Following World War II, Dreyfus created Panama corporations to hold funds for clients.  This practice had its roots in the desire of Jewish clients to protect their assets for reasons of personal safety, and the purpose and operation of the entities was to conceal ownership of the assets from all government authorities, “friendly” or otherwise.  However, the practice extended well into the 2000s.  Among the Panama entity accounts created by Dreyfus are 33 U.S.-related accounts, the oldest of which opened in 1951. 
 The combined high value of these accounts was approximately $90 million.  The U.S. person beneficial owners of the Panama entity accounts were properly identified as beneficial owners of the entities on Forms A pursuant to Swiss know your customer rules.  However, the entities were identified as the beneficial owner on IRS Forms W-8BEN, when, as Dreyfus well knew, the true beneficial owners were U.S. persons.  Dreyfus employees – primarily the Deputy Chairman of the Executive Management, a former member of Dreyfus’s Board of Directors and Head of the Gérance division, which provides services mainly to corporate entities, and a former deputy manager – also served as corporate directors of the entities.  
With respect to at least two Panama entity accounts, the entity structure was used to conceal payments into the United States.  For example, one Panama entity account was opened in 1991 with a husband and wife, both U.S. nationals living in the United States, as beneficial owners.  The account, which had a high value of over $1 million during the period since Aug. 1, 2008, was opened with funds inherited from a relative with an account at Dreyfus.  Beginning in 2008, checks in amounts between $4,000 and $5,000 each were sent to the husband and the couple’s three sons in the United States on a regular basis.  In total, 205 checks with a combined value of approximately $925,000 were sent to the individual family members in the United States.  Dreyfus’s efforts to convince the beneficial owners to disclose the account were unsuccessful, and the account was closed in 2012 without being disclosed to U.S. authorities. 
For four Panama entity accounts, Dreyfus allowed the accounts to be closed in the form of bearer shares, which assisted in the further concealment of assets in the accounts.  A bearer share is a security that is not required to be registered and which can be transferred without an endorsement of any kind.  Thus, a bearer share is negotiable by whoever possesses it.  For example, an individual can purchase shares from an issuer and exchange the shares for cash at a financial institution that redeems bearer shares or may give the shares to another individual, who may exchange the shares for cash.  The four Panama entities used assets in the accounts to purchase bearer shares at Dreyfus, with the shares then physically delivered to representatives of the Panama entities in closure of the accounts.  Because the shares could then be delivered to the U.S. persons whose assets were converted to bearer shares, or to anyone else, funds from these accounts left Dreyfus in a virtually untraceable manner.  With respect to these four accounts, over $4 million in assets left Dreyfus in the form of bearer shares.    
* * * *

Status of the NPAs and DOJ/IRS Mining of the Fruits of the NPAs (12/15/15)

Tax Notes Today reported that, at the ABA Criminal Tax Fraud and Tax Controversy 2015 seminar held in Las Vegas last week, the Acting AAG Tax, Carline Ciraolo, "reiterated her previously stated goal of completing the Swiss bank category 2 NPAs by the end of this month." Nathan J. Richman, Tax Division to Complete Non-Prosecution Agreements by Year-End, 2015 TNT 238-3 (12/11/15).  She reported that, as of that date, 61 category 2 NPAs had been entered and 1 NPA patterned on the category 2 NPAs had been entered with a non-bank, Finacor SA.  So, as I derive it, if the previously stated expectation of around 80 completed NPAs still holds, meeting the goal would mean that about 18 need to be entered between now and year end.  Of course, I would presume that the negotiation and drafting of the remaining NPAs is pretty far along, so that hopefully the holiday season for the parties involved will not be too disrupted just to meet what may be an arbitrary deadline of year end 2015.

She also said that the IRS has collected over $600 million from the program.  This is consistent with the numbers I reported after the last disclousre on 12/10/15.

As to the NPAs, she also beat the drum that the IRS and DOJ was obtaining a lot of information that will permit them to chase after tax cheats and enablers criminally and for tax cheats civilly.  As to criminally, the TNT report says:  "Ciraolo said that Swiss bank NPA criminal leads referred to the IRS may have already been developed by the Tax Division and may be accompanied by a request for referral back to the DOJ."  The process, therefore, seems to require a referral from the IRS in order for DOJ to seek indictment.  (That may be reading too much into the cryptic statement as reported, and the reporter may not have gotten it exactly right.)  I think -- no authority -- that prosecution would require the referral from the IRS.  The interesting issue would be if DOJ referred to the IRS with a request that the IRS refer back to DOJ with a prosecution recommendation, but the IRS determined for reasons based on its own assessment of the case and its systemic priorities not to make a prosecution recommendation.  For example, say that the IRS believed that the taxpayer had substantially complied with its voluntary disclosure program but DOJ was requesting a prosecution recommendation anyway (since DOJ says it is not bound by the IRS's voluntary disclosure program).  Could DOJ then prosecute for tax crimes without an IRS referral and recommendation?  I have been interested in this issue for a long time but have never been able to get a clear answer.  I do know that, in the KPMG grand jury investigation, when we had the initial contact for a DOJ conference, the DOJ attorney insisted that the prosecution recommendation that was on the table for the DOJ conference came from the IRS and not from the grand jury prosecutors.  And I subsequently heard (hearsay) that an IRS official who had been assigned to assist the grand jury actually made the decision as to who among the targets or subjects of the grand jury investigation would actually be prosecuted (meaning, I suppose, who would be referred to DOJ for prosecution).  I would think that the IRS recommendation for prosecution would be required in all tax prosecutions, at least where the gravamen of the misconduct is principally tax crimes.  If anyone has any thoughts or learning on this issue, please let me know.

Sunday, December 13, 2015

Sumner Redstone Owes the Gift Tax from 1972 But Not the Civil Fraud or Negligence Penalties (12/13/15)

In Redstone v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2015-237, here, Sumner Redstone was found liable for "a gift tax deficiency of $737,625 for the calendar quarter ending September 30, 1972."  That's right 1972.  The interest alone on that deficiency will be several, perhaps many times the principal amount of the tax.  (But astute readers will know that Sumner Redstone, a media mogul (see Wikipedia entry here), can pay all of it with little difficulty.)  That was the bad news for Mr. Redstone.  The good news is that the Tax Court relieved him from the civil fraud penalty (then 50%) and the accuracy related penalty (then 5%).  (I am not sure if, for the period in question, these civil penalties drew interest from the due date of the return as they do now.)  The disposition of the penalty issues makes the case interesting, for the determination of the substantive gift tax liability seemed to be relative straight-forward despite the passage of time since 1972.

I will refer to the players involved in the drama by their first names to distinguish them.  The father was Michael "Mickey" Redstone.  I'll call him Mickey, as does the Court.  There were two sons relevant here -- Edward and Sumner.  This opinion does not say a whole lot about Edward's education and experience, but it does say some things about Sumner's because, presumably, that is relevant to what he knew or should have known about the substantive tax liability back in 1972 and hence liability for the penalties.  The Court says cryptically:
Sumner graduated from Harvard College in 1944 and Harvard Law School in 1947. He practiced law for several years, including a stint in the Tax Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, before starting work in 1954 for the family business.
The Wikipedia entry fleshes this out just a bit:
After completing law school, Redstone served as special assistant to U.S. Attorney General Tom C. Clark (who later served as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States from 1949 to 1967)[3] and then worked for the United States Department of Justice Tax Division in Washington, D.C. and San Francisco, and thereafter entered private practice. 
From just these bare facts, one might surmise that Sumner was familiar with the tax law and the basic tax concepts that the Tax Court applied to determine that, on the facts, Sumner was liable for the gift tax in question.  One of those concepts is surely that transfers of value with a donative intent is a gift, potentially subject to gift reporting and tax.  But, Sumner pleaded ignorance -- certainly lack of intent in avoiding the civil fraud and negligence penalties.  Not only did he not have an intent to evade his tax liability, but he also was not negligent because he relied on this tax advisers and a memorandum from one tax adviser, which Sumner could not produce.

Well, let's get into the fact to set this up.  At some point, after Sumner left the practice of law to join the family business, the three created a corporation in which the three of them were nominal equal shareholders - 100 shares each.  The father contributed to that corporation disproportionately to the two sons, contributing almost 48%, with each son contributing around 26%.  (OK, there might have been a gift at that time from Mickey to the two sons or at least to someone; read on.)

Thursday, December 10, 2015

Two More Banks Obtain NPAs under DOJ Swiss Bank Program (12/10/15)

On December 10, 2015, DOJ announced here that Cornèr Banca SA (Cornèr) and Bank Coop AG (Bank Coop) have entered NPAs under the DOJ program for Swiss banks, here.  The penalties are:

Cornèr Banca SA (Cornèr)
$5.068 million
Bank Coop AG (Bank Coop)
$3.223 million

The banks will be added to the IRS's Foreign Financial Institutions or Facilitators, here.  As indicated in the last quoted paragraph, accountholders in the listed banks joining OVDP after one of their banks are listed will be subject to the 50% penalty in OVDP (provided that they do not opt out, in which case, who knows).

Here are the updated statistics for the Swiss Bank Program:

US DOJ Swiss Bank Program
Number
Number Resolved
Total Costs
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 1 (Criminal Inv.) *
16
4
$3,470,550,000
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 2 **
91
63
$610,949,990
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 3
14

$0
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 4
8

$0
Swiss Bank Program Results
129

$4,081,499,990




* Includes subsidiary or related entities counted as separate entities, so the numbers may exceed the numbers the IRS and DOJ posted numbers which combine some of the entities.



** DOJ says original total was 106 but that it expects about 80 to complete the process.



Tuesday, December 8, 2015

One More Bank Obtains NPA under DOJ Swiss Bank Program (12/8/15)

On November 24, 2015, DOJ announced here that the following Swiss bank entered an NPA under the DOJ program for Swiss banks, here.

Aargauische Kantonalbank (AKB) 
$1.983 million

The bank will be added to the IRS's Foreign Financial Institutions or Facilitators, here.  As indicated in the last quoted paragraph, accountholders in the listed banks joining OVDP after one of their banks are listed will be subject to the 50% penalty in OVDP (provided that they do not opt out, in which case, who knows).

Here are the updated statistics for the Swiss Bank Program:

US DOJ Swiss Bank Program
Number
Number Resolved
Total Costs
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 1 (Criminal Inv.) *
16
4
$3,470,550,000
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 2 **
91
61
$602,658,990
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 3
14

$0
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 4
8

$0
Swiss Bank Program Results
129

$4,073,208,990




* Includes subsidiary or related entities counted as separate entities, so the numbers may exceed the numbers the IRS and DOJ posted numbers which combine some of the entities.



** DOJ says original total was 106 but that it expects about 80 to complete the process.





Monday, December 7, 2015

New Transportation Bill, FAST, Adds Some Tax Provisions (12/7/15; 2/27/16)

This blog entry was substantially revised on 2/27/16 to incorporate the revisions I just made to my Federal Tax Procedure text:
XIII. Denial or Revocation of Passport for Seriously Delinquent Tax Debt.. 
Section 7345(a) [here] and 22 U.S.C. § 2714a [here], added in late 2015, require that, upon the IRS certification transmitted to the Secretary of State (through the Secretary of the Treasury) an individual has “a seriously delinquent tax debt,” the Secretary of State “shall not issue a passport” to the individual and, if a passport has already been issued, "may revoke" the individual's passport. n2234   A “seriously delinquent tax debt” is an assessed tax debt greater than $50,000 if a notice of  tax lien has been filed with CDP rights exhausted or lapsed or a levy under § 6331 has been made. n2235  Exceptions are made for debts for debts that are being paid “in a timely manner” pursuant to agreement with the IRS or which are subject to either a CDP hearing or an election for innocent spouse relief under § 6015. n2236 The IRS must “contemporaneously notify an individual of any certification under subsection (a).” n2237 The notice shall include notice of the certification and of the right to bring a civil action in the district court or Tax Court to contest whether the certification was erroneous. n2238  The certification must be reversed if the certification was erroneous, the tax debt is fully satisfied or the tax debt ceases to be a seriously delinquent tax debt as defined. n2239  The required notices of tax liens and notices of levy must include notice of § 6345's authority to deny or revoke passports. n2240 The Secretary of State may approve exceptions to these requirements in “emergency circumstances” or for “humanitarian reasons” n2241 or may limit the passport only for return to the U.S. n2242  Finally, apart from a seriously delinquent tax debt certification, the Secretary of State may deny a passport for failure to provide a valid Social Security Number. n2243.
   n2234 § 7345(a); and 22 U.S.C. § 2714a(e)(1).
   n2235 § 7345(b)(1). Like many of provisions of the Code, the amount is adjusted for inflation.  § 6345(f).
   n2236 § 7345(b)(2).
   n2237 § 7345(d).
   n2238 § 7345(e).
   n2239 § 7345(c)(1) (reversal of certification if error or debt paid or ceases to be a seriously delinquent tax debt) &(e)(2) (judicial determination of erroneous certification); 22 U.S.C. § 2714a(g).
   n2240 FAST Act § 32101(b), amending § 6320(a)(3) and § 6331(d)(4) to add this requirement.
   n2241 22 U.S.C. § 2714a(e)(1)(B) & (f)(1)(B).
   n2242 22 U.S.C. § 2714a(f)(2)(B). n2243 22 U.S.C. § 2714a(f)(1).

Other Provisions of FAST ACT

The other provisions of the bill are important but probably not of much interest to the readers of this blog.  The renewal of outsourcing of debt collection to private debt services is, I think, odd but not unexpected in today's political environment.  Without getting into the details, it seems to apply only to those debts which, from a collection perspective, are delinquent in the collection cycle and thus would require major IRS resources to collect.  For those debts, perhaps, it may make sense to permit some private debt collectors -- acting under proper safeguards spelled out in the statute -- expend their own resources to chase after the debts.  For more comment on the new provision, see Robert M. Wood, IRS Private Debt Collectors Are Now Legal: 10 Things You Should Know (Forbes 12/1/15), here.

Article Assessing the Role Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf, the Swiss Minister, In Switzerland's Retreat from Bank Secrecy to Evade Other Country Taxes (12/7/15)

SWI Swissinfor.ch has this very interesting article on Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf, the Swiss minister who oversaw and encouraged the Swiss retreat from bank secrecy. The minister who dismantled Swiss banking secrecy (Sissinfo.ch 12/6/15), here.  The article is very interesting, with various persons observing or involved in the process offering various levels of support as to her supervision of the process.  From the opening to get your interest:
As the curtain falls on Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf’s career in government, one of the most abiding legacies she leaves behind is the collapse of Swiss banking secrecy under her watch as Finance Minister. 
Her predecessor, Hans-Rudolf Merz, told the world in 2008 that it would “break its teeth on Swiss banking secrecy” if it tried to bring Switzerland to heel over tax evasion. But it has been the Swiss establishment spitting teeth after losing a bruising encounter with the United States that paved the way for a global surrender of secrecy. 
Praise and vitriol concerning Widmer-Schlumpf’s personal role in the process is spread out across the political spectrum. Her media comments throughout the crisis frequently inflamed rightwing politicians, who in 2012 demanded that the mandate to conduct banking secrecy negotiations be switched to the foreign ministry. 
There is one thing nearly everyone can agree on: the business model of employing secrecy to help foreign clients evade taxes in their own countries was defunct by the time Widmer-Schlumpf became Finance Minister in November 2010. 
But opinions diverge markedly when analysing exactly how this was achieved and judging whether Switzerland ended up with the best possible deal.

Saturday, December 5, 2015

The Cash Hoard Defense and ISIS Taxes (12/5/15)

Tax controversy enthusiasts will recall that one of the traditional defenses to the net worth method of proof often used in both civil and criminal cases is the cash hoard defense.  For an explanation of the cash hoard defense, see IRM 9.5.9.5  (11-05-2004), Net Worth Method of Proof, here.  The net worth method may be stated simply, although the concept may be difficult in application because it takes a lot of work:  The method is a simple comparison of the net worth at the beginning of the period and at the end of the period, with the assumption that increases in net worth from the beginning to the end coupled with expenditures in the period are taxable income unless otherwise explained (such as by gifts, unrealized appreciation in value, etc.).  The cash hoard defense argues that the agent incorrectly used the method because the agent understated beginning net worth by leaving out a "cash hoard" or other assets acquired before the beginning that contributed to the ending net worth or expenditures in the period.  Since cash is the usual claimed "hoard," this is referred to as the cash hoard defense.  E.g., 9.5.9.7.4.8  (11-05-2004), Cash on Hand Decrease, here. The DOJ Tax Criminal Tax Manual provides guidance on how to rebut the cash hoard defense.  See DOJ CTM 31.07[1], here

I heard an interesting application of the cash hoard defense today.  Planet Money had an episode title Auditing ISIS.  The episode is here.  The episode discusses a month's budget for an ISIS controlled area that listed income and expenditures.  The income was quite substantial, consisting significantly of oil sales, sales of antiquities, confiscations, various fines and penalties, and taxes, as well as other miscellaneous income.  I was particularly interested in the discussion of taxes.  The moderator interviewed a former resident of ISIS controlled territory who talked about the taxes and other compulsory exactions.  Apparently, ISIS has some form of income tax and will, perhaps arbitrarily, determine the amount of income and the tax that should be paid.  If the ISIS tax police find assets in your home (say cash or some valuable asset such as gold items), they would claim that is part of the income that is subject to tax.  The hapless "taxpayer" -- if that is the right word to use -- might, with valuable assets like gold at least, claim that those assets were from long ago, such as wedding gifts and therefore should not be considered for that particular genre of income tax.  I am not sure how often that would work in the ISIS controlled regions (wonder if ISIS keeps database entries on that), but I guess it is worth a try.  I am not sure I would want to be a lawyer presenting that defense to the ISIS tax police.

The FYE 2015 IRS CI Report (12/5/15)

CI has issued its FYE 2015 report, here.  The report is similar to past reports in presenting the materials.  I offer certain excerpts from the report below.  One key theme of the report is the decreases in budget, leading to decreasing staff resources and decreasing investigative results.  See on this theme my recent blog, Good Article on the State of CI (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 12/3/15), here. IRS CI reports some statistics in the report and does have a web page with even more statistics, here, including some presented in the report.  I will discuss the statistics on the investigative results when the FYE 2015 IRS Data Book comes out that will offer the statistics in slightly different ways that will permit me to dig out certain key statistics not offered in the report.

Here are the excerpts related principally to offshore account matters
[*1]  
The Swiss Bank program continued to provide solid leads and information that we are using to develop other cases around the world. Bank Leumi admitted to assisting U.S. taxpayers in hiding assets in offshore bank accounts, disclosed more than 1,500 U.S. account holders and agreed to pay a total of $270 million. This was the first time an Israeli bank has admitted to such criminal conduct. 
[*17] 
Abusive Tax Schemes 
Within the Abusive Tax Schemes program, CI focuses on the investigation of promoters and clients who willfully participate in domestic and/or offshore tax schemes for the purpose of violating the tax laws. Participants in these abusive schemes usually create structures such as trusts, foreign corporations and partnerships for the purpose of making it appear that a trustee, nominee, non-resident alien or other foreign entity is the owner of the assets and income, when in fact the true ownership and control remains with a United States taxpayer. 
[*18] 
Four Pennsylvania Family Members Sentenced for Tax Fraud 
On July 23, 2015, in Allentown, Pennsylvania, four Lancaster County family members were sentenced to prison for their participation in a long-term, complex and concerted effort to avoid taxation. In October 2010, Chester A. Bitterman Jr. and his sons, Craig L. Bitterman, C. Grant Bitterman and Curtis L. Bitterman, were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States. Craig Bitterman was additionally convicted of obstruction of justice. Prior to sentencing, the defendants paid $437,000 in restitution to the IRS. The four were sentenced as follows: Craig L. Bitterman was sentenced to 36 months in prison; C. Grant Bitterman was sentenced to 21 months in prison; Curtis L. Bitterman was sentenced to 21 months in prison; and Chester A. Bitterman Jr. was sentenced to three years’ probation. According to court documents, from 1996 to 2005, the Bittermans owned and operated the Bitterman Scale Company. To conceal their income and assets from the IRS, the Bittermans used aliases, offshore bank accounts and a complex series of sham paper transactions to disguise income. The defendants transferred their personal and business assets to sham trusts purchased from the Commonwealth Trust Company, an organization that marketed trust products to clients for the purpose of avoiding federal income tax payment. The trusts were used to make it appear as though the defendants had little or no assets or income. In reality, the defendants retained complete access and control over their funds. 
[*33] 
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 
The immense growth in the utilization of global financial markets presents new challenges to tax administration worldwide. CI’s Office of International Operations (IO) promotes a comprehensive international strategy in responding to global financial crimes and provides support in combating offshore tax evasion. Since the means to evade taxes and commit fraud is not limited by sovereign borders, international collaboration is vital to CI’s efforts to combat offshore tax evasion and fraud committed by individuals.
CI has special agent attachés strategically stationed in 10 foreign countries. Attachés continue to build strong alliances with our foreign government and law enforcement partners. These strong alliances provide CI with the ability to develop international case leads and to support domestic investigations with an international nexus. CI attachés are especially focused on promoters from international banking institutions who facilitate United States taxpayers in evading their United States tax requirements. There are several senior analysts assigned to CI headquarters who are responsible for managing program areas designed to generate investigative leads. 
[*34] 
In 2015 IO created the Investigation Development and Support Unit (IDS). The IDS is a newly created section of IO that was formed when the former International Lead Development Center (ILDC), Offshore Voluntary Compliance group and the Counterterrorism Center (CTC) were merged together and placed under one management structure. This new unit is located in the Office of International Strategy and Policy. The new unit continues to offer its resources to the field in a case support capacity
while also focusing on developing significant financial investigations independent of the leads being received. 
The growth of the CI footprint internationally has increased the opportunities for case development. The IDS is specifically tasked with conducting research on potential international criminal investigations. In addition, CI has personnel assigned to Interpol and the International Organized Crime Intelligence and Operations Center (IOC-2) to combat the threats posed by international criminal organizations, assist in joint investigations and the apprehension of international fugitives. 
* * * *
Examples of international investigations adjudicated in FY 2015 include: 

Friday, December 4, 2015

Two Related Banks Obtain NPAs under DOJ Swiss Bank Program (12/4/15)

On December 3,, 2015, DOJ announced here that  EFG Bank European Financial Group SA, Geneva (EFG Group), and EFG Bank AG (EFG Bank) have jointly resolved their Category 2 submissions and entered NPAs under the DOJ program for Swiss banks, here.  The joint penalties are 29.988 million.

The relationships of the banks and their higher level entities are:
EFG Group is a holding company and Swiss bank based in Geneva, Switzerland, which is owned by European Financial Group EFG (Luxembourg) SA.  EFG Group is the direct and controlling shareholder of EFG International AG, which is a holding company.  EFG Bank, which is headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland, and has another Swiss office in Geneva, is the main Swiss private banking subsidiary of EFG International AG.  EFG Bank also has representative offices and branches in Asia and the Americas.  In 2003, EFG Bank acquired the Geneva-based bank Banque Édouard Constant (BEC).  While EFG Group and EFG Bank are participating jointly in the Swiss Bank Program, these two EFG banks are separate legal entities with distinct management and board control.
Some interesting excerpts (bold face by JAT):
One EFG Bank private banker had an established third-party client referral model for U.S. clients that involved two lawyers in the United States, one U.S. accountant and one Swiss fiduciary company.  At least one member of EFG’s senior management approved and supported this private banker’s relationship with one of the two U.S. lawyers.  This same U.S. lawyer asked the EFG private banker not to travel into the United States with a computer and requested that they communicate about U.S. taxpayer clients through faxes rather than email.  The EFG private banker responded, “[R]ight – next travel I travel will take no computer with me – I will then buy me one at BestBuy and leave it there for use when I am travelling. So I never will cary [sic] a computer over the border.” 
* * * * 
EFG also serviced certain U.S. clients with undeclared accounts held in the names of insurance companies and not the actual beneficial owner of the funds, known colloquially as an insurance wrapper.  Insurance wrappers were marketed by third-party providers in the wake of the UBS investigation as a means of disguising the beneficial ownership of U.S. clients.  These particular accounts were all held in the name of insurance providers.  By the operation of Swiss bank secrecy laws, the U.S. client’s ownership would not be disclosed to U.S. authorities, including the IRS.  
* * * * 
With respect to assets transferred to accounts in countries other than the United States and Switzerland upon account closure, significant amounts were transferred to numerous other jurisdictions.  For example, the following amounts were transferred in connection with the closure of U.S.-related accounts:
  • At least $12,680,000 was transferred to Bermuda;
  • At least $12,460,000 was transferred to Guernsey;
  • At least $25,200,000 was transferred to Liechtenstein;
  • At least $12,260,000 was transferred to Monaco;
  • At least $25,000,000 was transferred to Luxembourg; and
  • At least $33,550,000 was transferred to Hong Kong.
In connection with the closure of U.S.-related accounts, significant amounts also were transferred to the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Israel, Panama, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates.
The banks will be added to the IRS's Foreign Financial Institutions or Facilitators, here.  As indicated in the last quoted paragraph, accountholders in the listed banks joining OVDP after one of their banks are listed will be subject to the 50% penalty in OVDP (provided that they do not opt out, in which case, who knows).

Here are the updated statistics for the Swiss Bank Program:

US DOJ Swiss Bank Program
Number
Number Resolved
Total Costs
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 1 (Criminal Inv.) *
17
5
$3,470,550,000
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 2 **
91
60
$600,675,990
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 3
14

$0
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 4
8

$0
Swiss Bank Program Results
130

$4,071,225,990




* Includes subsidiary or related entities counted as separate entities, so the numbers may exceed the numbers the IRS and DOJ posted numbers which combine some of the entities.



** DOJ says original total was 106 but that it expects about 80 to complete the process.





Thursday, December 3, 2015

IRS Use of Cell-Site Simulators (Also called Stingray) to Retrieve Information About and From Cell Phones (12/3/15)

The IRS's use of so-called cell-site simulators have been in the news recently.  I thought it might be helpful to introduce readers the topic.  First, I will provide some information on the scope of the technology as I understand it and then the legal issues from its use by law enforcement, including the IRS.  I am by no means an expert in the technology and have no unique insight into how the IRS or other law enforcement agencies are using the technology.  I am essentially repeating what I read in the news and tax media.

Nature of the Technology

The American Civil Liberties Union (commonly referred to as "ACLU") has this very brief description, here, of the technology:
Stingrays, also known as "cell site simulators" or "IMSI catchers," are invasive cell phone surveillance devices that mimic cell phone towers and send out signals to trick cell phones in the area into transmitting their locations and identifying information. When used to track a suspect's cell phone, they also gather information about the phones of countless bystanders who happen to be nearby.
Wikipedia has this discussion, here, of the Harris Corporation version, called Stingray, which seems to the most popular version used by law enforcement and the version used by the IRS.  Wikipedia further says that the word "Stingray has also become a generic name to describe these kinds of devices." Wikipedia's general description is (footnotes omitted):
The StingRay is an IMSI-catcher (International Mobile Subscriber Identity), a controversial cellular phone surveillance device, manufactured by Harris Corporation.Initially developed for the military and intelligence community, the StingRay and similar Harris devices are in widespread use by local and state law enforcement agencies across the United States and possibly covertly in the United Kingdom. 
* * * * 
The StingRay is an IMSI-catcher with both passive (digital analyzer) and active (cell site simulator) capabilities. When operating in active mode, the device mimics a wireless carrier cell tower in order to force all nearby mobile phones and other cellular data devices to connect to it. 
The features of the technology that are apparently of most concern are what Wikipedia calls the "Active Mode Operations" and "Capabilities." 
Active mode operations 
1. Extracting stored data such as International Mobile Subscriber Identity ("IMSI") numbers and Electronic Serial Number ("ESN"),
2. Writing cellular protocol metadata to internal storage
3. Forcing an increase in signal transmission power,
4. Forcing an abundance of radio signals to be transmitted
5. Interception of communications content
6. Tracking and locating the cellular device user,
7. Conducting a denial of service attack
8. Encryption key extraction.
9. radio jamming for either general denial of service purposes or to aid in active mode protocol rollback attacks

Good Article on the State of CI (12/3/15)

David Voracos of BloombergBusiness has a good article this morning on staffing and funding problems for IRS's Criminal Investigation ("CI").  IRS Loses Hundreds of Criminal Agents as Tax Cheats Take Heart (BloombergBusiness 12/3/15), here.  The immediate impetus for the article is the IRS's FYE 2015 Report, here.  The release announcing the report, IR-2015-135 is here.  I will discuss the report in a future blog entry after I have time to review it in more detail.  I think, however, that the cited article offers some good background for the state of CI via some interviews and analysis not directly appearing in the report.  Some excerpts from the article:
Tax cheats can breathe a little easier. The gun-toting Internal Revenue Service investigators who send felons to prison are retiring in droves and there’s no one to replace them. 
IRS Criminal Investigation agents are the elite special forces in the never-ending war on tax evasion. They are feared among criminals for their unmatched ability to follow the money, assess net worth and find fraud in corporate books. They have been at the center of major tax and money-laundering cases involving Swiss banks, FIFA soccer officials, and the Costa Rican digital currency company, Liberty Reserve. 
Despite those victories, these are dark days for CI agents. Scandals and budget wars between the Obama administration and House Republicans are thinning out the ranks of the IRS’s 84,000 employees. By the end of next year, the number of criminal agents is projected to fall by 21 percent since 2011. 
* * * * 
“It’s hard to continue to work in an environment when your agency is constantly bashed, and your funding is slashed,” said Toni Weirauch, 52, who retired as a top CI manager in May. “I loved my career but I was exhausted by the end.” 
* * * * 
As they head for the exits, the bright minds that have researched and built complex cases for decades are no longer available to mentor replacements, should they ever get hired. The number of investigators fell to 2,316 this year from 2,739 in 2011 and are projected to hit 2,166 next year. Since 2013, only 45 new agents have been hired, and the IRS has said it doesn’t expect to add any more in 2016.  
This brain drain translates to fewer resources to fight tax evasion and corporate frauds, even as CI tackles the vexing variations and growing complexity of identity theft and cybercrimes. New investigations fell 27 percent to 3,853 this year compared with 2013. Tax investigations fell by 32 percent, according to a CI annual report released Wednesday. 

Wednesday, December 2, 2015

In Summons Enforcement Proceeding, Court Rejects Taxpayer's Lack of Possession Defense For Foreign Account Documents (12/2/15)

When the IRS or a grand jury has reason to believe that a taxpayer has a foreign account, it may issue compulsory process for the account documents.  The compulsory process will be an IRS summons or a grand jury subpoena.  As I have discussed earlier in this blog, many taxpayers have unsuccessfully asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege (via act of production).  The Courts have held that the required records doctrine overcomes the assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege.

In United States v. Malhas, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151990 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2015), here, the taxpayer attempted another tack -- the lack of possession defense.  In summary, the defense is that the a party subject to compulsory process cannot produce documents that he does not possess or, if he doesn't possess, have sufficient control over that he could possess the documents.  In Malhas, a summons enforcement proceeding, the Court ruled that, once the IRS has proved it likely that the taxpayer does have the possession or control, the summons can be enforced.

Some interesting features of the opinion are:

1.  "Malhas argued that his control over the bank account at issue [apparently then at UBS] was cancelled on August 3, 2004 when a third party he has never met, Ms. Moosleeithner-Batliner, became an authorized signator and cancelled 'the authorized signatory of Dr. Malhas.'" The opinion does not explain why someone Malhas had never met took over the signatory authority.  Apparently, the Court did not credit this cryptic claim.

2.  "Further, Malhas alleged that the bank transferred all assets from the account at issue [with UBS] to 'Banque Baring Brothers Sturdaza' on September 24, 2008, rendering any attempt to contact 'UBS for account documents . . . useless.'"  The opinion does not indicate how Malhas knew about that transfer if he had nothing to do with the account after 2004.  Apparently, the summons sought records.

3.  Also, the transferee bank -- Banque Baring Brothers Sturdaza -- is one I have not seen surface in the Swiss bank brouhaha.  The US TAX PROGRAM list of Swiss banks participating the U.S. DOJ Swiss Bank Program, here, does list the bank, but assigns no program category to it.  Yet, the timing of the transfer from UBS to Banque Baring Brothers suggests that the bank should perhaps be in the Category 2 program.   In this regard, all category 2 banks have not yet been identified.  The bank's website is here, indicating that the spelling of the last word is "Sturdza."  Googling turns up some interesting stuff, such as the indication in a BloombergBusiness article that it is "Swiss private bank overseeing the wealth of tennis players, soccer stars and other athletes."  See Giles Broom, Baring Swiss Bank for Rich Athletes Buys Asset Manager Coges (BloombergBusiness 2/4/13), here.

4.  Malhas dithered but finally indicated to the Court that, if it would just wait, he "'intend[ed] to issue written requests to both the Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) and Banque Baring Brothers Sturdaza to forward to him, with a copy to the IRS, all records, statements and documents regarding any and all non-U.S. accounts, pertaining to Dr. Malhas . . . for the calendar years 2006, 2007, and 2008.'"  Yet, he admitted that "despite being approached by the IRS as early as early 2012 and learning of the November 5 evidentiary hearing on October 8, he had yet to make such contact with the banks at issue."  The Court was not pleased and denied any further time before ruling on the summons enforcement petition, noting "its surprise that Malhas had not previously sought these documents from the banks at issue."

5.  The IRS presented "numerous documents [showing] that Malhas was connected to the banks at issue during the relevant time period."  The court later referred in the quote below to this as a "plethora of documents and records illustrating Malhas's connections with the international banks and the accounts at issue."

6.  In enforcing the summons, the Court has a good discussion of the law relating to the lack of possession defense and the burden on the summonsed party to prove the defense of lack of possession.  Here are the critical paragraphs from the discussion:
A number of Circuit Courts of Appeals have detailed what the taxpayer must show at this hearing to successfully illustrate that he "lacks possession" of the relevant documents. Some have held that it is within the district court's discretion to simply determine whether the facts show that the taxpayer does, or does not, possess the relevant documents. See Barth, 745 F.2d at 187-88 (directing the lower court to "rule explicitly on [the defendant's] defense of nonpossession based on the present record and on any additional evidence the parties may wish to present" and concluding that if the lower court "finds that [the defendant] possesses the [documents], then enforcement may be granted; if [the court] determines that [the defendant] does not possess them, then enforcement should be denied"); see also Gippetti, 153 F. App'x. at 868, citing Barth, 745 F.2d at 187. Others have established the standard in more detail. Specifically, they have stated that, "the party resisting enforcement bears the burden of producing credible evidence that he does not possess or control the documents sought." United States v. Billie, 611 Fed. App'x. 608, 610 (11th Cir. 2015), quoting United States v. Huckaby, 776 F.2d 564, 567 (5th Cir. 1985). Importantly, this "credible evidence" standard operates on a sliding scale: the more the government's evidence suggests the defendant possesses the documents at issue, the heavier the defendant's burden to successfully demonstrate that he does not. Id. at 610-11 ("[T]he burden would be heavy in the present circumstances -- [the defendant's] prior production of materials and his title as Custodian of Records strongly suggest he maintains control and possession."). 
Here, Malhas has failed to satisfy his burden regardless of what standard the Court applies. Specifically, Malhas did not present any evidence at the November 5 evidentiary hearing, let alone "credible evidence" that he did not possess the documents at issue. Huckaby, 775 F.2d at 567. As the government noted, the Court has already found that the IRS's petition was valid under Powell, rendering Malhas's eleventh hour argument otherwise, moot. Further, the IRS's plethora of documents and records illustrating Malhas's connections with the international banks and the accounts at issue overshadowed Malhas's cursory references to the signatory and asset-transfer documents. Specifically, the IRS undercut the importance by pointing out Malhas's "password" that enabled him to access the accounts at issue without a signature. Thus, Malhas's utter lack of evidence left him unable to convince the Court that he does not have possession or custody of the documents. Indeed, even Malhas implied just the opposite. In his November 3 emergency motion, Malhas suggested the banks at issue may possess the summonsed documents, admitting that "[i]f the banks produce documents sought by Petitioner in response to Dr. Malhas' request, compliance would presumably no longer be an issue, and enforcement will be moot." (R. 29 at 2.) Similarly, when asked by the Court at the November 4 emergency motion hearing what he expected to receive from the banks, Malhas admitted that he expected the institutions could produce relevant documents that may go toward compliance with the IRS's summons. These admissions cut against any argument that Malhas does not possess the documents, and it certainly does not satisfy his heavy burden at this stage. See Kis, 658 F.2d at 544. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Malhas has failed to meet his heavy burden, and the IRS has presented compelling evidence that he possesses or has custody of the documents and records the IRS seeks. The Court, therefore, orders him to comply with the IRS's summons by January 12, 2016.
5.  The summons enforcement order gives Malhas until January 12, 2016, to comply.  If he pulled out all stops immediately after the order was issued, he may be able to retrieve the summonsed documents.

Wednesday, November 25, 2015

One More Bank Obtains NPA under DOJ Swiss Bank Program (11/25/15)

On November 24, 2015, DOJ announced here that the following Swiss banks have entered NPAs under the DOJ program for Swiss banks, here.

IHAG Zürich AG (IHAG)
$7.453 million

One interesting excerpt from the press release:
In a few instances, IHAG assisted certain recalcitrant U.S. persons in further concealing undisclosed accounts by moving the funds to another jurisdiction and returning the funds to IHAG in a different name in order to conceal the U.S. persons’ ownership of the assets and enable the recalcitrant accountholders to continue to maintain undeclared accounts at IHAG.  For example, a family of U.S. persons held assets at IHAG in the name of a Liechtenstein foundation, and another unrelated U.S. person held funds in the name of a Panama foundation.  These foundation structures were designed to conceal the true beneficial ownership of the assets.  In the case of the Panama foundation, IHAG assisted the U.S. person in creating the foundation.  The value of the assets in the two accounts together totaled approximately $63 million. 
To assist these U.S. clients in further concealing their assets and evading U.S. taxes, in order to maintain these recalcitrant individuals as IHAG clients, IHAG personnel – with the assistance of an unaffiliated fiduciary services firm in Zurich and with the knowledge and approval of bank management – moved assets from the two foundation accounts to an unaffiliated bank in Hong Kong. The funds then returned to IHAG under the name of a Singapore entity wholly owned by IHAG’s parent company, IHAG Holding, so that the accounts would bear no trace of the U.S. persons’ beneficial interest in the assets held in the accounts.  The multi-step scheme also involved an entity in Hong Kong in which IHAG Holding owned a minority interest. 
This scheme enabled the assets to be stripped of any indicia of U.S. ownership.  In effectuating this scheme, IHAG took advantage of Swiss law, which allowed IHAG in these circumstances to treat the accounts as if know-your-customer review of the accounts had occurred in Singapore.  Accordingly, IHAG did not apply Swiss know-your-customer requirements when the accounts returned to IHAG under a different name.  IHAG’s files for the accounts deliberately did not contain any documentation of the U.S. persons’ interest in the assets in the accounts.  IHAG knowingly and willfully committed tax fraud with respect to those accounts.  
In a few other instances, IHAG assisted clients in establishing foundations used to hold their assets at IHAG.  The U.S. persons who were the beneficial owners of the foundation accounts were properly identified as beneficial owners of the foundations on certain forms pursuant to Swiss know-your-customer rules.  However, the foundations were identified as the beneficial owner on IRS Forms W-8BEN, thereby masking the true beneficial ownership of the accounts by U.S. persons. 
Here are the updated statistics for the Swiss Bank Program:

US DOJ Swiss Bank Program
Number
Number Resolved
Total Costs
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 1 (Criminal Inv.) *
17
5
$3,470,550,000
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 2 **
90
58
$570,687,990
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 3
14

$0
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 4
8

$0
Swiss Bank Program Results
129

$4,041,237,990




* Includes subsidiary or related entities counted as separate entities, so the numbers may exceed the numbers the IRS and DOJ posted numbers which combine some of the entities.



** DOJ says original total was 106 but that it expects about 80 to complete the process.